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Abstract
Social interactions determine many economic behaviors, but information on social ties
does not exist in most publicly available and widely used datasets. We present results on the
identification of social networks from observational panel data that contains no information on
social ties between agents. In the context of a canonical social interactions model, we provide
sufficient conditions under which the social interactions matrix, endogenous and exogenous
social effect parameters are all globally identified. While this result is relevant across different
estimation strategies, we then describe how high-dimensional estimation techniques can be
used to estimate the interactions model based on the Adaptive Elastic Net GMM method.
We employ the method to study tax competition across US states. We find the identified social
interactions matrix implies tax competition differs markedly from the common assumption of
competition between geographically neighboring states, providing further insights for the long-
standing debate on the relative roles of factor mobility and yardstick competition in driving
tax setting behavior across states. Most broadly, our identification and application show the
analysis of social interactions can be extended to economic realms where no network data
exists. JEL Codes: C31, D85, H71.
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1 Introduction
In many economic environments, behavior is shaped by social interactions between agents. In in-
dividual decision problems, social interactions have been key to understanding outcomes as diverse
as educational test scores, the demand for financial assets, and technology adoption (Sacerdote,
2001; Bursztyn et al., 2014; Conley and Udry, 2010). In macroeconomics, the structure of firm’s
production and credit networks propagate shocks, or help firms to learn (Acemoglu et al., 2012;
Chaney, 2014). In political economy, ties between jurisdictions are key to understanding tax setting
behavior (Tiebout, 1956; Shleifer, 1985; Besley and Case, 1994).
Underpinning all these bodies of research is some measurement of the underlying social ties
between agents. However, information on social ties does not exist in most publicly available and
widely used datasets. To overcome this limitation, studies of social interaction either postulate ties
based on common observables or homophily, or elicit data on networks. However, it is increasingly
recognized that postulated and elicited networks remain imperfect solutions to the fundamental
problem of missing data on social ties, because of econometric concerns that arise with either
method, or simply because of the cost of collecting network data.1
Two consequences are that: (i) classes of problems in which social interactions occur are un-
derstudied, because social networks data is missing or too costly to collect; (ii) there is no way
to validate social interactions analysis in contexts where ties are postulated. In this paper we
tackle this challenge by deriving sufficient conditions under which global identification of the en-
tire structure of social networks is obtained, using only observational panel data that itself contains
no information on network ties. Our identification results allow the study of social interactions
without data on social networks, and the validation of structures of social interaction where social
ties have hitherto been postulated.
A researcher is assumed to have panel data on individuals i = 1, ..., N for instances t = 1, ..., T .
An instance refers to a specific observation for i and need not correspond to a time period (for
example if i refers to a firm, t could refer to market t). The outcome of interest for individual i in
instance t is yit and is generated according to a canonical structural model of social interactions:2
yit = ρ0
N∑
j=1
W0,ijyjt + β0xit + γ0
N∑
j=1
W0,ijxjt + αi + αt + it (1)
1As detailed in de Paula (2017), elicited networks are often self-reported, and can introduce error for the outcome
of interest. Network data can be censored if only a limited number of links can feasibly be reported. Incomplete
survey coverage of nodes in a network may lead to biased aggregate network statistics. Chandrasekhar and Lewis
(2016) show that even when nodes are randomly sampled from a network, partial sampling leads to non-classical
measurement error, and biased estimation. Collecting social network data is also a time and resource intensive
process. In response to these concerns, a nascent strand of literature explores cost-effective alternatives to full
elicitation to recover aggregate network statistics (Breza et al., 2017).
2Blume et al. (2015) present micro-foundations based on non-cooperative games of incomplete information for
individual choice problems, that result in this estimating equation for a class of social interaction models.
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Outcome yit depends on the outcome of other individuals to whom i is socially tied, yjt, and
xjt includes characteristics of those individuals (or lagged values of yit). W0,ij measures how the
outcome and characteristics of j causally impact the outcome for i. As outcomes for all individuals
obey equations analogous to (1), the system of equations can be written in matrix notation where
the structure of interactions is captured by the adjacency matrix, denoted W0. Our approach
allows for unobserved heterogeneity across individuals αi and common shocks to all individuals
αt. This framework encompasses the classic linear-in-means specification of Manski (1993). In
his terminology, ρ0 and γ0 capture endogenous and exogenous social effects, and αt captures
correlated effects. The distinction between endogenous and exogenous peer effects is critical, as
only the former generates social multiplier effects.
Manski’s seminal contribution set out the reflection problem of separately identifying endoge-
nous, exogenous and correlated effects in linear models. However, it has been somewhat overlooked
that he also set out another challenge on the identification of the social network in the first place.3
This is the problem we tackle and so expand the scope of identification beyond ρ0, β0 and γ0. Our
point of departure from much of the literature is to therefore presumeW0 is entirely unknown to the
researcher. We derive sufficient conditions under which all the entries in W0, and the endogenous
and exogenous social effect parameters, ρ0 and γ0, are globally identified. By identifying the social
interactions matrix W0, our results allow the recovery of aggregate network characteristics such
as the degree distribution and patterns of homophily, as well as node-level statistics such as the
strength of social interactions between nodes, and the centrality of nodes. This is useful because
such aggregate and node-level statistics often map back to underlying models of social interaction
(Ballester et al., 2006; Jackson et al., 2017; de Paula, 2017).
The mathematical strategy for our identification result is new and fundamentally different from
those employed elsewhere in this nascent literature (and does not rely on requirements on network
sparsity). However it delivers sufficient conditions that are mild, and relate to existing results on
the identification of social effects parameters when W0 is known (Bramoullé et al., 2009; De Giorgi
et al., 2010; Blume et al., 2015). Our identification result is also useful in other estimation contexts,
such as when a researcher has partial knowledge ofW0, or in navigating between priors on reduced-
form (later denoted Π) and structural (later denoted θ) parameters in a Bayesian framework, thus
avoiding issues raised in Kline and Tamer (2016).
Global identification is a necessary requirement for consistency of extremum estimators such as
those based on GMM (Hansen 1982; Newey and McFadden 1994). Our identification analysis thus
3Manski (1993) highlights difficulties (and potential restrictions) for identifying ρ0, β0 and γ0 when all individuals
interact with each other, and when this is observed by the researcher. In (1), this corresponds to W0,ij = N−1, for
i, j = 1, . . . , N . At the same time, he states (p. 536), “I have presumed that researchers know how individuals form
reference groups and that individuals correctly perceive the mean outcomes experienced by their supposed reference
groups. There is substantial reason to question these assumptions (...) If researchers do not know how individuals
form reference groups and perceive reference-group outcomes, then it is reasonable to ask whether observed behavior
can be used to infer these unknowns (...) The conclusion to be drawn is that informed specification of reference
groups is a necessary prelude to analysis of social effects.”
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provides primitives for this important condition. To estimate the model, we employ the Adaptive
Elastic Net GMMmethod (Caner and Zhang, 2014) because this allows us to deal with a potentially
high-dimensional parameter vector (in comparison to the time dimension in the data) including
all the entries of the social interactions matrix W0, though other estimation protocols may also be
entertained (e.g., using Bayesian methods or a priori information as previously alluded).4
We showcase the method using Monte Carlo simulations based on stylized random network
structures as well as real world networks. In each case, we take a fixed network structure W0,
and simulate panel data as if the data generating process were given by (1). We then apply the
method on the simulated panel data to recover estimates of all elements in W0, as well as the
endogenous and exogenous social effect parameters (ρ0, γ0). The networks considered vary in
size, complexity, and their aggregate and node-level features. Despite this heterogeneity, we find
the method to perform well in all simulations. In a reasonable dimension of panel data T and
with varying node numbers across simulations (N), we find the true network structure W0 is well
recovered. For each simulated network, the majority of true links are correctly identified even for
T = 5, and the proportion of true non-links (zeroes in W0) captured correctly as zeros is over 85%
even when T = 5. Both proportions rapidly increase with T . A fortiori, we estimate aggregate
and node-level statistics of each network, demonstrating the accurate recovery of key players in
networks for example. Furthermore, biases in the estimation of endogenous and exogenous effects
parameters (ρˆ, γˆ) fall quickly with T and are close to zero for large sample sizes.
In the final part of our analysis, we apply the method to shed new light on a classic real
world social interactions problem: tax competition between US states. The literatures in political
economy and public economics have long recognized the behavior of state governors might be
influenced by decisions made in ‘neighboring’ states. The typical empirical approach has been to
postulate the relevant neighbors as being geographically contiguous states. Our approach allows
us to infer the set of economic neighbors determining social interactions in tax setting behavior
from panel data on outcomes and covariates alone. In this application, the panel data dimensions
cover mainland US states, N = 48, for years 1962-2015, T = 53.
We find the identified network structure of tax competition to differ markedly from the common
assumption of competition between geographic neighbors. The identified network has fewer edges
than the geography-based network, that gets reflected in the far lower clustering coefficient in the
identified network than in the geographic network (.026 versus .194). With the recovered social
4The elastic net was introduced by Zou and Hastie, 2005 in part to circumvent difficulties faced by alternative
estimation protocols (e.g., LASSO) when the number of parameters, p, exceeds the number of observations, n
(where p and n follow the notation in that paper). Whereas the theoretical results on the large sample properties of
elastic net estimators usually have not exploited sparsity, several articles have demonstrated its performance in data
scenarios where this occurs. For example, Zou and Hastie, 2005 consider an application to leukemia classification
where p = 7, 129 and n = 72 (see their Section 6) and Zou and Zhang, 2009 explore a scenario where p = 1, 000
and n = 200. The favourable performance of the elastic net in these cases also relates to the literature on the
‘effective number of parameters’ (or ‘effective degrees of freedom’) in the estimation of sparse models (Tibshirani
and Taylor, 2012). In Section 3 we provide an informal calculation for the minimum number of time periods such
that penalized estimation is feasible in our context.
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interactions matrix we establish, beyond geography, what covariates correlate to the existence of
ties between states and the strength of those ties. We identify non-adjacent states that influence
tax setting and, more broadly, we establish that social interactions are highly asymmetric: some
states – such as Delaware, a well known low-tax state – are especially focal in driving tax setting
in other jurisdictions. We use all these results to shed new light on the main hypotheses for social
interactions in tax setting: factor mobility and yardstick competition (Tiebout, 1956; Shleifer,
1985; Besley and Case, 1994).
Our paper contributes to the literature on the identification of social interactions models.
The first generation of papers studied the case where W0 is known, so only the endogenous and
exogenous social effects parameters need to be identified. It is now established that if the known
W0 differs from the linear-in-means example, ρ0 and γ0 can be identified (Bramoullé et al., 2009;
De Giorgi et al., 2010). Intuitively, identification in those cases can use peers-of-peers, that are
not necessarily connected to individual i and can be used to leverage variation from exclusion
restrictions in (1), or can use groups of different sizes within which all individuals interact among
each other (Lee, 2007). Bramoullé et al. (2009) show these conditions are met if I,W0 and W 20 are
linearly independent, which is shown to hold generically by Blume et al. (2015). However, as made
precise in Section 2, the linear algebraic arguments employed in Bramoullé et al. (2009) or Blume
et al. (2015) do not apply when W0 is unobserved and other arguments have to be used instead.5
Our paper builds on these papers by studying the problem where W0 is entirely unknown
to the researcher. In so doing, we open up the study of social interactions to the many realms
where complete social network data does not actually exist. Closely related to our work, Blume
et al. (2015) investigate the case when W0 is partially observed. Specifically, Blume et al. (2015,
Theorem 6) show that if two individuals are known to not be directly connected, the parameters
of interest in a model related to (1) can be identified. An alternative approach is taken in Blume
et al. (2011, Theorem 7): they suggest a parameterization of W0 according to a pre-specified
distance between nodes. We do not impose such restrictions, but note that partial observability
of W0 (as in Blume et al., 2015) or placing additional structure on W0 (as in Blume et al., 2011)
is complementary to our approach as it reduces the number of parameters in W0 to be retrieved.
Bonaldi et al. (2015) and Manresa (2016) estimate models like (1) when W0 is not observed,
but where ρ0 is restricted to be zero so there are no endogenous social effects. They use sparsity-
inducing methods from the statistics literature, but the presence of ρ0 in our case complicates
identification non-trivially because it introduces issues of simultaneity that we address.
Rose (2015) also presents related identification results for linear models like (1). Assuming
sparsity of the neighborhood structure, Rose (2015) offers identification conditions under rank re-
strictions on sub-matrices of the reduced form coefficient matrix from a regression of outcomes (yit)
5Alternative identification approaches when W0 is known focus on higher moments (variances and covariances
across individuals) of outcomes (de Paula, 2017), and rely on additional restrictions on the higher moments of it.
We also note that (1) is a spatial autoregressive model. There, W0 is also typically assumed known. Anselin (2010)
reviews this literature.
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on covariates (xit). Intuitively, given two observationally equivalent systems, sparsity guarantees
the existence of pairs that are not connected in either. Since observationally equivalent systems are
linked via the reduced-form coefficient matrix, this pair allows one to identify certain parameters in
the model. Having identified those parameters, Rose (2015) shows that one can proceed to identify
other aspects of the structure (see also Gautier and Rose, 2016). This is related to the ideas in
Blume et al. (2015, Theorem 6), who show identification results can be leveraged if individuals are
known not to be connected. Our main identification results presented in the next section do not
rely on properties of sparse networks, and make use of plausible and intuitive conditions, whereas
the auxiliary rank conditions necessary in Rose (2015) may be computationally complex to verify.
More recently, Lewbel et al. (2019) propose an estimation strategy for the parameters ρ0, β0 and
γ0 of model (1) in the absence of network links if many different groups are able to be observed.
Finally, in the statistics literature, Lam and Souza (2019) study the penalized estimation of
model (1) when W0 is not observed, assuming the model and social interactions are identified.
The statistical literature on graphical models has investigated the estimation of neighborhoods
defined by the covariance structure of the random variables at hand (Meinshausen and Buhlmann,
2006). This corresponds to a model where yt = (I − ρ0W0)−1t is jointly normal (abstracting
from covariates). On a graph with N nodes corresponding to the variables in the model, an
edge between two nodes (variables) i and j is absent when these two variables are conditionally
independent given the other nodes. In this Gaussian model, this corresponds to a zero ij entry in
the inverse covariance matrix for yt (see, e.g., Yuan and Lin, 2007, p. 19). In the model above,
the inverse covariance matrix is (I − ρ0W0)>Σ−1 (I − ρ0W0), where Σ is the variance covariance
structure for t. The discovery of zero entries in this matrix is not equivalent to the identification
of W0 as we study, and involves Σ (as do identification strategies using higher moments when W0
is known).6 Related studies in the statistics literature also focus on higher moments and define
neighborhoods differently (Diebold and Yilmaz, 2015; Rothenhäusler et al., 2015).
Our conclusions discuss how our approach can be modified, and assumptions weakened, to
integrate in partial knowledge of W0. We also discuss the next steps required to simultaneously
identify models of network formation and the structure of social interactions.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our core result: the sufficient conditions
under which the social interactions matrix, endogenous and exogenous social effects are globally
identified. Section 3 describes the high-dimensional estimation techniques used, based on the
Adaptive Elastic Net GMM method and presents simulation results from stylized and real-world
networks. Section 4 applies our methods to study tax competition between US states. Section 5
concludes. The Appendix provides proofs and further details on estimation and simulations.
6In fact, Meinshausen and Buhlmann (2006)’s neighborhood estimates (as also Lam and Souza (2019)’s) rely on
(penalized) regressions of yit on y1t, . . . , yi−1,t, yi+1,t, . . . , yN,t, which do not address the econometric endogeneity
in estimating W0.
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2 Identification
2.1 Setup
Consider a researcher with panel data covering i = 1, . . . , N individuals repeatedly observed over
t = 1, . . . , T instances. We consider that the number of individuals N in the network is fixed, but
potentially large. The aim is to use this data to identify a social interactions model, with no data on
actual social ties being available. For expositional ease, we first consider identification in a simpler
version of the canonical model in (1), where we drop individual-specific (αi) and time-constant
fixed effects (αt), and assume xit is a one-dimensional regressor for individual i and instance t. Of
course, we later extend the analysis to include individual-specific and time-constant fixed effects,
and also allow for multidimensional covariates xk,it, k = 1, . . . , K. We adopt the subscript “0” to
denote parameters generating the data, and non-subscripted parameters are generic values in the
parameter space:
yit = ρ0
N∑
j=1
W0,ijyjt + β0xit + γ0
N∑
j=1
W0,ijxjt + it. (2)
As outcomes for all individuals i = 1, . . . , N obey equations analogous to (2), the system of
equations can be more compactly written in matrix notation as:
yt = ρ0W0yt + β0xt + γ0W0xt + t. (3)
The vector of outcomes yt = (y1t, . . . , yNt)′ assembles the individual outcomes in instance t; the
vector xt does the same with individual characteristics. yt, xt and t have dimension N × 1, the
social interactions matrix W0 is N × N , and ρ0, β0, and γ0 are scalar parameters. We do not
make any distributional assumptions on t beyond E(t|xt) = 0 (or E(t|zt) = 0 for an appropriate
instrumental variable zt if xt is also endogenous). We assume the network structure is predeter-
mined and constant, and that the number of individuals N is fixed. The network structure W0 is
a parameter to be identified and estimated.7
A regression of outcomes on covariates corresponds, then, to the reduced form for (3),
yt = Π0xt + νt, (4)
with Π0 = (I − ρ0W0)−1(β0I + γ0W0) and νt ≡ (I − ρ0W0)−1t. If W0 is observed, Bramoullé
et al. (2009) note that a structure (ρ, β, γ) that is observationally equivalent to (ρ0, β0, γ0) is such
that (I − ρ0W0)−1(β0I + γ0W0) = (I − ρW0)−1(βI + γW0). This equation can be written as a
7A related set of papers instead focuses on the distribution of networks generating the pattern in data and aims
to estimate aggregate network effects. Souza (2014) offers several identification and estimation results in this spirit.
In particular, he infers the network distribution within a certain class of statistical network formation models from
outcome data from many groups, such as classrooms, in few time periods. We instead concentrate on estimating
the set of links for one group of size N followed over t = 1, . . . , T instances.
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linear equation in I,W0 and W 20 and identification is established if those matrices are linearly
independent. If W0 is not observed, the putative unobserved structure now comprises W and
an observationally equivalent parameter vector will instead satisfy (I − ρ0W0)−1(β0I + γ0W0) =
(I−ρW )−1(βI+γW ). Following the strategy in Bramoullé et al. (2009) would lead to an equation
in I,W,W0 and WW0, and the insights obtained in that paper then do not carry over for the case
we study when W0 is unknown.
We establish identification of the structural parameters of the model, including the social
interactions matrixW0, from the coefficients matrix Π0. Without data on the networkW0, we treat
it as an additional parameter in an otherwise standard model relating outcomes and covariates.
Our identification strategy relies on how changes in covariates xit reverberate through the system
and impact yit, as well as outcomes for other individuals. These are summarized by the entries
of the coefficient matrix Π0, which, in turn, encode information about W0 and (ρ0, β0, γ0). A
non-zero partial effect xit of yjt indicates the existence of direct or indirect links between i and
j. When ρ0 = 0 (and Π0 = β0I + γ0W0), only direct links would produce such a correlation.
When ρ 6= 0, both direct and indirect connections may generate a non-zero response but distant
connections will lead to a lower response. Our results formally determine sufficient conditions to
precisely disentangle these forces.
We first set out five assumptions underpinning our main identification results. Three of these
are entirely standard in the social interactions. A fourth is a normalization required to separately
identify (ρ0, γ0) from W0, and the fifth is closely related to known results on the identification
of (ρ0, γ0) when W0 is known (Bramoullé et al., 2009). These Assumptions (A1-A5) deliver an
identified set of up to two points.
Our first assumption explicitly states that no individual affects himself and is a standard
condition in social interaction models:
(A1) (W0)ii = 0, i = 1, . . . , N .
With Assumption (A1), we can omit elements on the diagonal ofW0 from the parameter space.
We thus can denote a generic parameter vector as θ = (W12, . . . ,WN,N−1, ρ, γ, β)
′ ∈ Rm, where
m = N (N − 1) + 3, and Wij is the (i, j)-th element of W . Reduced-form parameters can be tied
back to the structural model (3) by letting Π : Rm → RN2 define the relation between structural
and reduced-form parameters:
Π(θ) = (I − ρW )−1 (βI + γW ) ,
where θ ∈ Rm, and Π0 ≡ Π(θ0).
As t (and, consequently, νt) is mean-independent from xt, E[t|xt] = 0, the matrix Π0 can
be identified as the linear projection of yt on xt. We do not impose additional distributional
assumptions on the disturbance term, except for conditions that allow us to identify the reduced-
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form parameters in (4). If xt is endogenous, i.e. E[t|xt] 6= 0, a vector of instrumental variables
zt may still be used to identify Π0. In either case, identification of Π0 requires variation of the
regressor across individuals i and through instances t. In other words, either E[xtx′t] (if exogeneity
holds) or E[xtz′t] (otherwise) are full-rank.
Our next assumption controls the propagation of shocks and guarantees they die as they rever-
berate through the network. This provides adequate stability in the system, and is closely related
to the concept of stationarity in network models. It implies the maximum eigenvalue norm of ρ0W0
is less than one. It also ensures (I−ρ0W0) is a non-singular matrix, and so the variance of yt exists,
the transformation Π(θ0) is well-defined, and the Neumann expansion (I−ρ0W0)−1 =
∑∞
j=0(ρ0W0)
j
is appropriate.
(A2)
∑N
j=1 |ρ0(W0)ij| < 1 for every i = 1, . . . , N , ‖W0‖ < C for some positive C ∈ R and |ρ0| < 1.
We next assume that network effects do not cancel out, another standard assumption.
(A3) β0ρ0 + γ0 6= 0.
The need for this assumption can be shown by expanding the expression for Π(θ0), which is possible
by (A2):
Π(θ0) = β0I + (ρ0β0 + γ0)
∞∑
k=1
ρk−10 W
k
0 . (5)
If Assumption (A3) were violated, β0ρ0 + γ0 = 0 and Π0 = β0I so the endogenous and exogenous
effects balance each other out, and network effects are altogether eliminated in the reduced form.8
Identification of the social effects parameters (ρ0, γ0) requires that at least one row of W0 adds
to a fixed and known number. Otherwise, ρ0 and γ0 cannot be separately identified from W0.
Clearly, no such condition would be required if W0 was observed.
(A4) There is an i such that
∑
j=1,...,N(W0)ij = 1.
LettingWy ≡ ρ0W0 andWx ≡ γ0W0 denote the matrices that summarize the influence of peers’
outcomes (the endogenous social effects) and characteristics on one’s outcome (the exogenous social
effects), respectively, the assumption above can be seen as a normalization. In this case, ρ0 and γ0
represent the row-sum for individual i in Wy and Wx, respectively.9 In line with the literature, we
8One important case is when networks do not determine outcomes, which we interpret as ρ0 = γ0 = 0 or withW0
representing the empty network. From equation (5), it is clear that if Π(θ0) is not diagonal with constant entries,
then it must be that (ρ0β0 + γ0) 6= 0, which implies that ρ0 6= 0 or γ0 6= 0, and also that W0 is non-empty. Taken
together, this suggests that the observation that Π(θ0) is not diagonal is sufficient to ensure that network effects
are present and Assumption (A3) is not violated.
9An alternative to Assumption (A4) is to impose the normalization on the parameters. For example, one could
normalize ρ∗ = 1 and allow the network to be rescaled accordingly. In this case, W ∗ = ρ0W0 would be identified
instead. Also Wx =
γ0
ρ0
W ∗ so γ0 would be identified relative to ρ0. Wy and Wx are unchanged.
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maintain that the same W0 governs the structure of both endogenous (Wy) and exogenous (Wx)
effects. We later discuss relaxing this assumption when more than one regressor is used.
Our final assumption provides for a specific kind of network asymmetry. We require the diagonal
of W 20 not to be constant as one of our sufficient conditions for identification.
(A5) There exists l, k such that (W 20 )ll 6= (W 20 )kk, i.e. the diagonal of W 20 is not proportional to
ι, where ι is the N × 1 vector of ones.
In unweighted networks, the diagonal of the square of the social interactions matrix captures
the number of reciprocated links for each individual or, in the case of undirected networks, the
popularity of those individuals. Assumption (A5) hence intuitively suggests differential popularity
across individuals in the social network.
This assumption is related to the network asymmetry condition proposed elsewhere, such as in
Bramoullé et al. (2009). They show that when W0 is known, the structural model (2) is identified
if I, W0, and W 20 are linearly independent. Given the remaining assumptions, this condition is
satisfied if (A5) is satisfied, but the converse is not true: one can construct examples in which I,
W0, and W 20 are linearly independent when W 20 has a constant diagonal, so that Π0 does not pin
down θ0. The strengthening of this hypothesis is the formal price to pay for the social interactions
matrix W0 being unknown to the researcher.10
Before proceeding to our formal results, we provide a very simple illustration to shed light
on how the assumptions above come together to provide identification. Suppose the observed
reduced-form matrix is,
Π0 =
1
455
 275 310 0310 275 0
0 0 182
 ,
and that, following (A4), the first row is normalized to one. From the third row and column of Π0,
we see there is no path of any length connecting the individual in row 3 to or from those in rows 1
10To see the strength of the assumption of Bramoullé et al. (2009) when W0 is known, choose constants c1, c2,
and c3 such that c1I+c2W0+c3W 20 = 0. Focusing on diagonal elements of this condition, we see that if the diagonal
of W 20 is not proportional to the diagonal of I, then c1 = c3 = 0 because diag(W0) = 0. It follows that c2 = 0 if at
least one (off-diagonal) element of W0 is non-zero. However, the converse is not true, so that if Assumptions A1-A5
do not hold, one can construct examples where Π0 does not pin down θ0. Take, for instance, N = 5 with θ0 and θ
where β = β0 = 1, ρ = 1.5, ρ0 = 0.5, γ = −2.5, γ0 = 0.5,
W0 =

0 0.5 0 0 0.5
0.5 0 0.5 0 0
0 0.5 0 0.5 0
0 0 0.5 0 0.5
0.5 0 0 0.5 0
 and W =

0 0 0.5 0.5 0
0 0 0 0.5 0.5
0.5 0 0 0 0.5
0.5 0.5 0 0 0
0 0.5 0.5 0 0
 .
Both W and W0 violate (A5) ((W 2)kk = (W 20 )kk = 0.5 for any k), and ρ violates (A2). Nonetheless, I,W0
and W 20 are linearly independent and, likewise, so are I,W , and W 2. In this case, both parameter sets produce
Π = (I − ρ0W0)−1(β0I + γ0W0) = (I − ρW )−1(βI + γW ). This arises even as W and W0 represent very different
network structures: any pair connected under W is not connected under W0 and vice-versa.
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or 2 since her outcome is not affected by their covariates and their outcomes are not affected by her
covariates. In other words, individual 3 is isolated and (W0)13 = (W0)23 = (W0)31 = (W0)32 = 0.
On the other hand, individuals 1 and 2 cannot be isolated as their covariates are correlated with
the other individual’s outcome, reflecting (A5).11 Due to the row-sum normalization of the first
row, (W0)12 = 1. Using (A3), it can be seen that W0 is symmetric if Π0 is symmetric. We thus
find that (W0)21 = 1. This and (A1) map all elements of W0, and thus,
W0 =
 0 1 01 0 0
0 0 0
 .
As the third individual is isolated, she will be only be affected by her exogenous xi and not by
endogenous or exogenous peer effects. Hence the (3, 3) element of Π0 is equal to β0 = 182455 = .4.
To find ρ0, note that (I − ρ0W0)Π0 = β0I + γ0W0. Hence focussing on the (1,1) elements of the
matrices above, we find that 275
455
− ρ0 310455 = .4, implying ρ0 = .3 (complying with (A2)). Finally, γ0
is identified from entry (1, 2), giving γ0 = 310455 − .3275455 = .5.
2.2 Main Identification Results
Under the relatively mild assumptions above, we can begin to identify parameters related to the
network. These results are then useful for our main identification theorems. Let λ0j denote an
eigenvalue ofW0 with corresponding eigenvector v0,j for j = 1, . . . , N . Assumptions (A2) and (A3)
allow us to identify the eigenvectors of W0 directly from the reduced form. As |ρ0| < 1:
Π0v0,j = β0v0,j + (ρ0β0 + γ0)
∞∑
k=1
ρk−10 W
k
0 v0,j
=
[
β0 + (ρ0β0 + γ0)
∞∑
k=1
ρk−10 λ
k
0,j
]
v0,j
=
β0 + γ0λ0,j
1− ρ0λ0,j
v0,j. (6)
The infinite sum converges as |ρ0λ0,j| < 1 by (A2). The equation above implies that v0,j is also
an eigenvector of Π0 with associated eigenvalue λΠ,j =
β0+γ0λ0,j
1−ρ0λ0,j . The fact that eigenvectors of
Π0 are also eigenvectors of W0 has a useful implication: eigencentralities may be identified from
the reduced form, even when W0 is not identified. As detailed in de Paula (2017) and Jackson
et al. (2017), such eigencentralities often play an important role in empirical work as they allow a
11If on the other hand, (W0)ij = 0.5, i 6= j in violation of (A5) and all agents were connected, the model would
not be identified.
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mapping back to underlying models of social interaction.12
Now let Θ ≡ {θ ∈ Rm : Assumptions (A1)-(A5) are satisfied} be the structural parameter
space of interest. Our first theorem establishes local identification of the mapping. A parameter
point θ0 is locally identifiable if there exists a neighborhood of θ0 containing no other θ which
is observationally equivalent. Using classical results in Rothenberg (1971), we show that our
assumptions are sufficient to ensure that the Jacobian of Π relative to θ is non-singular, which, in
turn, suffices to establish local identification.
Theorem 1. Assume (A1)-(A5). θ0 ∈ Θ is locally identifiable.
An immediate consequence of local identification is that the set {θ ∈ Θ : Π(θ) = Π(θ0)} is
discrete (i.e. its elements are isolated points). The following corollary establishes that Π is a proper
function, i.e. the inverse image Π−1(K) of any compact set K ⊂ RN2 is also compact (Krantz and
Parks, 2013, p. 124). Since it is discrete, the identified set must be finite.
Corollary 1. Assume (A1)-(A5). Then Π(·) is a proper mapping. Moreover, the set {θ : Π(θ) =
Π(θ0)} is finite.
Under additional assumptions, the identified set is at most a singleton in each of the partitioning
sets Θ− ≡ Θ ∩ {ρβ + γ < 0} and Θ+ ≡ Θ ∩ {ρβ + γ > 0}.13 Since Θ = Θ− ∪ Θ+, if the sign
of ρ0β0 + γ0 is unknown, the identified set contains, at most, two elements. In the theorem that
follows, we show global identification only for θ ∈ Θ+, since arguments are mirrored for θ ∈ Θ−.
Theorem 2. Assume (A1)-(A5), then for every θ ∈ Θ+ we have Π(θ) = Π(θ0) ⇒ θ = θ0. That
is, θ0 is globally identified with respect to the set Θ+.
Similar arguments apply if Theorem 2 instead were to be restricted to θ ∈ Θ−. The proof of the
corollary below is immediate and therefore omitted.
Corollary 2. Assume (A1)-(A5). If ρ0β0 + γ0 > 0, then the identified set contains at most one
element, and similarly if ρ0β0 + γ0 < 0. Hence, if the sign of ρ0β0 + γ0 is unknown, the identified
set contains, at most, two elements.14
12To identify the eigencentralities, we identify the eigenvector that corresponds to the dominant eigenvalue. IfW0
is non-negative and irreducible, this is the (unique) eigenvector with strictly positive entries, by the Perron-Frobenius
Theorem for non-negative matrices (see Horn and Johnson, 2013, p.534).
13The global inversion results we use are related to, but different from, those used by Komunjer (2012), Lee
and Lewbel (2013) and Chiappori et al. (2015). Those authors use variations on a classical inversion result of
Hadamard. In contrast, we employ results on the cardinality of the pre-image of a function, relying on less stringent
assumptions. Specifically, while the classical Hadamard result requires that the image of the function be simply-
connected (Theorem 6.2.8 of Krantz and Parks, 2013), the results we rely on do not.
14Under some special conditions, the mirror image of θ0 can be characterized from equation (5). If −W0 sat-
isfies Assumption (A4), we may set ρ∗ = −ρ0, β∗ = β0, γ∗ = −γ0 and W ∗ = −W0. Then ρ0β0 + γ0 =
−(ρ∗β∗ + γ∗). Also note that ∑∞k=1 ρk−10 W k0 = −∑∞k=1(ρ∗)k−1(W ∗)k, and so (ρ0β0 + γ0)∑∞k=1 ρk−10 W k0 =
(ρ∗β∗ + γ∗)
∑∞
k=1(ρ
∗)k−1(W ∗)k. It follows that Π(θ0) = Π(θ∗), where θ∗ = (ρ∗, β∗, γ∗,W ∗).
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We now turn our attention to the problem of identifying the sign of ρ0β0 + γ0 from the obser-
vation of Π0. This would then allow us to establish global identification using Theorem 2. It is
apparent from (5) that if ρ0 > 0 and (W0)ij ≥ 0, for all i, j = {1, . . . , N} the off-diagonal elements
of Π0 identify the sign of ρ0β0 + γ0.
Corollary 3. Assume (A1)-(A5). If ρ0 > 0 and (W0)ij ≥ 0, the model is globally identified.
Real world applications often suggest endogenous social interactions are positive (ρ0 > 0), in
which case global identification is fully established by Corollary 3. On the other hand, if ρ0 < 0
(which is so if outcomes are strategic substitutes, for example), ρk0 in (5) alternates signs with k,
and the off-diagonal elements no longer carry the sign of ρ0β0 + γ0. Nonetheless, if W0 is non-
negative and irreducible (i.e., not permutable into a block-triangular matrix or, equivalently, a
strongly connected social network), the model is also identifiable without further restrictions on
ρ0:
Corollary 4. Assume (A1)-(A5), (W0)ij ≥ 0 and W0 is irreducible. If W0 has at least two real
eigenvalues or |ρ0| <
√
2/2, then the model is globally identified.
Corollary 4 holds if there are at least two real eigenvalues, or if ρ0 is appropriately bounded.
Since W0 is non-negative, it has at least one real eigenvalue, by the Perron-Frobenius Theorem. If
W0 is symmetric, for example, its eigenvalues are all real, and Corollary 4 holds. It also holds if
(W0)ij ≤ 0, as we can re-write the model as ρW0 = −ρ|W0| where |W0|, is the matrix whose entries
are the absolute values of the entries in W0. In any case, the bound on |ρ0| is sufficient and holds
in most (if not all) empirical estimates we are aware of obtained from either elicited or postulated
networks, and in our application on tax competition.
2.3 Extensions
2.3.1 Individual Fixed Effects
We observe outcomes for i = 1, . . . , N individuals repeatedly through t = 1, . . . , T instances.
If t corresponds to time, it is natural to think of there being unobserved heterogeneity across
individuals, αi, to be accounted for when estimating Π0. The structural model (2) is then,
yit = ρ0
N∑
j=1
W0,ijyjt + β0xit + γ0
N∑
j=1
W0,ijxjt + αi + it,
which can be written in matrix form as,
yt = ρ0W0yt + xtβ0 +W0xtγ0 + α
∗ + t,
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where α∗ is the vector of fixed effects. Individual-specific and time-constant fixed effects can be
eliminated using the standard subtraction of individual time averages. Defining y¯t = T−1
∑T
t=1 yt,
x¯t = T
−1∑T
t=1 xt and ¯t = T
−1∑T
t=1 t,
yt − y¯t = ρ0W0 (yt − y¯t) + (xt − x¯t) β0 +W0 (xt − x¯t) γ0 + t − ¯t,
if W0 is does not change with time. Identification from the reduced form follows from previous
theorems, since Π0 is unchanged when regressing yt − y¯t on xt − x¯t.15
2.3.2 Common Shocks
We next allow for unobserved common shocks to all individuals in the network in the same instance
t. Such correlated effects αt can confound the identification of social interactions. As we have not
placed any distributional assumption on the covariance matrix of the disturbance term, our analysis
readily incorporates correlated effects that are orthogonal to xt. When this is not the case, one
possibility is to model the corrected effects αt explicitly. The model then is,
yt = ρ0W0yt + xtβ0 + γ0W0xt + αtι+ t,
where αt is a scalar capturing shocks in the network common to all individuals. Let Π01 =
(I − ρ0W0)−1 and Π02 = (β0I + γ0W0) such that Π0 = Π01Π02. The reduced-form model is,
yt = Π0xt + αtΠ01ι+ vt.
We propose a transformation to eliminate the correlated effects: exclude the individual-invariant
αt, subtracting the mean of the variables at a given period (global differencing). For this purpose,
define H = 1
n
ιι′. We note that in empirical and theoretical work it is customary to strengthen
Assumption (A4) and require that all rows of W0 sum to one if no individual is isolated (see for
example Blume et al., 2015). This strengthened assumption is usually referred to as row-sum
normalization, and is stated below:
(A4’) For all i = 1, ...N we have that
∑
j=1,...,N(W0)ij = 1.
This can be written compactly asW0ι = ι. In this case,W0 can be interpreted as the normalized
adjacency matrix. Under row-sum normalization we have that,
(I −H) yt = (I −H) (I − ρ0W0)−1 (β0I + γ0W0)xt + (I −H) (I − ρ0W0)−1 t
= (I −H) Π0xt + (I −H) vt,
15As is the case in panel data, this would require strict exogenity (E[s|xt] = 0 for any s and t) or predetermined
errors (E[s|xt] = 0 for s ≥ t) so that the matrix Π0 can be consistently estimated.
14
because (I −H) (I − ρ0W0)−1 αtι = 0 if Assumption (A4’) holds. It then follows that Π˜0 =
(I −H)Π0 is identified. The next proposition shows that, under row-sum normalization of W0, Π0
is identified from Π˜0 (and, as a consequence, the previous results immediately apply).
Proposition 1. If W0 is diagonalizable and row-sum normalized, Π0 is identified from Π˜0.
Under row-sum normalization of W0, a common group-level shock affects individuals homo-
geneously since (I − ρ0W0)−1αtι = αt(I + ρ0W0 + ρ20W 20 + · · · )ι = αt1−ρ0 ι, which is a vector with
no variation across entries. Consequently, global differencing eliminates correlated effects and
(I −H) (I − ρ0W0)−1 αtι = (I − ρ0W0)−1 αt (I −H) ι = 0. In the absence of row-sum normaliza-
tion, global differencing does not ensure that correlated effects are eliminated. To see this, note
that (I − ρ0W0)−1 is no longer row-sum normalized and, crucially, αt(I − ρ0W0)−1ι is not a vector
with constant entries.
The next proposition makes this point formally, that the stronger Assumption (A4’) is necessary
to eliminate group-level shocks, by showing it is not possible to construct a data transformation
that eliminates group effects in the absence of row-sum normalization.
Proposition 2. Define rW0 = (I − ρ0W0)−1ι. If in space Θ = {θ ∈ Rm : Assumptions (A1)-(A5)
are satisfied} there are N matrices W (1)0 , . . . ,W (N)0 such that [rW (1)0 · · · rW (N)0 ] has rank N , then
the only transformation such that (I − H˜)(I − ρ0W0)−1ι = 0 is H˜ = I.
It is useful to be able to test for row-sum normalization (A4’) as it enables common shocks to
be accounted for in the social interactions model. This is possible as,
Π0ι = β0ι+ (ρ0β0 + γ0)
∞∑
k=1
ρk−10 W
k
0 ι
=
[
β0 + (ρ0β0 + γ0)
∞∑
k=1
ρk−10
]
ι
=
β0 + γ0
1− ρ0
ι. (7)
The last equality follows from the observation that, under row-normalization of W0, W k0 ι = W0ι =
ι, k > 0. This implies Π0 has constant row-sums, which suggests row-sum normalization is testable.
In the Appendix we derive a Wald test statistic to do so.16
16For ease of explanation, in the Appendix we derive the test under the asymptotic distribution of the OLS
estimator. The test generally holds with minor adjustments for estimators with known asymptotic distributions.
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2.3.3 Multivariate Covariates
Next allowing for multivariate xt of dimension n× k, the reduced-form model (4) is,
yt =
K∑
k=1
Π0,kxk,t + νt,
where Π0,k = (I − ρ0W0)−1
(
β0,k + γ0,kW0
)
, xk,t refers to the k-th column of xt, and β0,k and
γ0,k select the k-th element of K-dimensional β0 and γ0, respectively. The previous identification
results then apply sequentially to each Π0,k, k = 1, . . . , K. In fact, we only then need to maintain
Wx = γ0W0 for one covariate. It is therefore possible to allow the structure of endogenous and
exogenous social effects to differ for K − 1 of the covariates. With K covariates, equation (3) is,
yt = ρ0W0yt +
K∑
k=1
β0,kxt +
K∑
k=1
γ0,kW0,kxk,t + t.
Let W0,k = W0 be the case for k = 1. Then, having identified ρ0 and W0 from Π1,0,
(I − ρ0W0)Π0,k = β0,kI + γ0,kW0,k,
for k = 2, . . . , K. The parameter β0,k then corresponds to the diagonal elements of (I − ρ0W0)Π0,k
and the off-diagonal entries correspond to the off-diagonal elements of γ0,kW0,k. If Assumption
(A4) holds for every k = 1, . . . , K, we can identify γ0,k and thus W0,k for every k = 1, . . . , K.17
3 Implementation
We now transition from our core identification results to their practical implementation. As this is
a high-dimensional estimation problem, our preferred approach makes use of the Adaptive Elastic
Net GMM (Caner and Zhang, 2014), that is based on the penalized GMM objective function. Given
the identification results presented in Section 2, the populational version of the GMM objective
function will be uniquely minimized at the true parameter vector.
After setting out the estimation procedure, we showcase the method using Monte Carlo simu-
lations based both on stylized random network structures as well as real world networks. In each
case, we take a fixed network structure W0, and simulate panel data as if the data generating
process were given by (1). We apply the method on the simulated panel data to recover estimates
of all elements in W0, as well as the endogenous and exogenous social effect parameters.
17Blume et al. (2015) also study the case in which the social structure mediating endogenous and exogenous social
effects might differ. When Wx is known and there is partial knowledge of the endogenous social interaction matrix
W0, they show that the parameters of the model can be identified (their Theorem 6). Analogously, when there are
enough unconnected nodes in each of the social interaction matrices represented by Wx and W0, and the identity
of those nodes is known, identification is also (generically) possible (their Theorem 7).
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3.1 Estimation
The parameter vector to be estimated is high-dimensional: θ = (W12, . . . ,WN,N−1, ρ, γ, β)
′ ∈ Rm,
where m = N (N − 1) + 3 and Wij is the (i, j)-th element of the N ×N social interactions matrix
W0. To be clear, in a network with N individuals, there are N(N − 1) potential interactions
because individuals could interact with everyone else but herself (which would violate Assumption
A1). As a consequence, even with a modest N , there are many more parameters to estimate and
m is large. For example, a network with N = 50 implies more than two thousand parameters
to estimate. While we consider N (and thus m) is fixed, we still refer to θ as high-dimensional.
OLS estimation requires m  NT (⇒ N  T ), so many more time periods than individuals: a
requirement often met in finance data sets (van Vliet, 2018) or in other fields (see, e.g., Section 4.2
in Rothenhäusler et al., 2015). Instead, to estimate a large number of parameters with limited data
we utilize high-dimensional estimation methods, that are the focus of a rapidly growing literature.
However, the identification results presented in Section 2 apply more broadly and irrespective of
the estimation procedure.
Sparsity is a key assumption underlying all high-dimensional estimation techniques. In the
context of social interactions, we say that W0 is sparse if m˜, the number of non-zero elements of
W0, is such that m˜ NT . The notion of sparsity thus depends on the number of of time periods:
although N and m are fixed, m˜ itself can grow with T . Sparsity corresponds to assuming that
individuals influence or are influenced by a small number of others, relative to the overall size of
the potential network and the time horizon in the data. As such, sparsity is typically not a binding
constraint in social networks analysis.18
In the estimation of sparse models, the “effective number of parameters” (or “effective degrees
of freedom”) relates to the number of variables with non-zero estimated coefficients (Tibshirani and
Taylor, 2012). In the context of the current social network model (and the Elastic Net estimator
on which the estimation strategy below builds on), this is approximately equivalent to the density
of the network times the number of parameters m. We then require this number to be smaller
than T . Implicitly, this calculation provides a rough assessment on the minimum required T . For
example, with N = 30 and a network with 2% of potential links in place, this implies T should be
larger than 18.
Finally, to reiterate, our identification results themselves do not depend on the sparsity of
networks. In particular, Assumptions A1 to A5 do not impose restrictions on the number of links
18For example, common stylized networks are sparse, such as: (i) star: all individuals receive spillovers from the
same individual; (ii) lattice: each individual is a source of spillover only to one other individual; (iii) interactions in
pairs or triads or small groups, such as those described by De Giorgi et al. (2010); and (iv) small world networks
(Watts, 1999). Prominent real world economic networks are also sparse. For example, in individual-level elicited
data from AddHealth on teenage friendships (defined as reciprocated nominations), the density of links is around
2% of all feasible links. In firm-level data, the density of production networks in the US is less than 1% of all feasible
links (Atalay et al., 2011).
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in W0, or m˜.19
Our preferred approach estimates the interaction matrix in the reduced form while penalizing
and imposing sparsity on the structural object W0. We impose sparsity and penalization in the
structural-form matrix W0 because this is a weaker requirement than imposing sparsity and penal-
ization in the reduced-form matrix Π0.20 To accomplish this, we make use of the Adaptive Elastic
Net GMM (Caner and Zhang, 2014), that is based on the penalized GMM objective function,
GNT (θ, p) ≡ gNT (θ)′MTgNT (θ) + p1
N∑
i,j=1
i 6=j
|Wi,j|+ p2
N∑
i,j=1
i 6=j
|Wi,j|2 (8)
where θ = (W1,2, . . . ,WN,N−1 ρ, γ, β)′ with dimension m = N(N − 1) + 3, and p1 and p2 are the
penalization terms. The term gNT (θ)
′MTgNT (θ) is the unpenalized GMM objective function with
moment conditions based on the orthogonality between the structural disturbance term and the
covariates: gNT (θ) =
∑T
t=1 [x1tet(θ)
′ · · · xNtet(θ)′]′, et(θ) = yt − (I − ρW )−1 (βI + γW )xt. There
are q ≡ N2 moment conditions since xit is orthogonal to ejt, for each i, j = 1, . . . , N . Hence the
GMM weight matrixMT is of dimension N2×N2, symmetric, and positive definite. For simplicity,
we use MT = IN2×N2 . Note that if xt is econometrically endogenous, one can also exploit moment
conditions with respect to available instrumental variables.21
Given the identification results presented in Section 2, if θ 6= θ0 and does not belong to the
identified set, then Π(θ) 6= Π(θ0). Consequently, the populational version of the GMM objective
function is uniquely minimized at the true parameter vector θ0.
The penalization terms in (8) is what makes this different from a standard GMM problem.
The first term, p1
∑N
i,j=1,i 6=j |Wi,j|, penalizes the sum of the absolute values of Wij, i.e. the sum
of the strength of links, for all node-pairs. The second term, p2
∑N
i,j=1,i 6=j |Wi,j|2, penalizes the
sum of the square of the parameters. This term has been shown to provide better model-selection
properties, especially when explanatory variables are correlated (Zou and Zhang, 2009). The first
stage estimate is,
θ˜(p) = (1 + p2/T ) · arg min
θ∈Rp
GNT (θ, p) (9)
where (1 + p2/T ) is a bias-correction term also used by Caner and Zhang (2014).
19If N →∞, Assumption A2 would imply vanishing (W0)ij entries. As highlighted previously, we consider N to
be fixed, in line with many practical applications. Furthermore, Assumption A2 is used to represent inverse matrices
as Neumann series in our identification results. What is necessary for this to hold is that a sub-multiplicative norm
on ρW be less than one. Here we use a specific norm (i.e., the maximum row sum norm), but other (induced) norms
are also possible (i.e., the 2-norm or the 1-norm) (see Horn and Johnson, 2013, Chapter 5.6).
20Note that even if W is sparse, Π may not be sparse. In Appendix B.1, we show that [Π0]ij = 0 if, and only if,
there are no paths between i and j in W0, and so the pair is not connected. So sparsity in Π0 is understood as W0
being ‘sparsely connected’, which is a stronger assumption than sparsity in W0.
21For expositional ease, we describe estimation in the context of the reduced form model (4), thereby abstaining
from individual fixed or correlated effects. As the GMM estimator uses moments between the structural disturbance
terms and covariates, this endogeneity is built into the estimation procedure.
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Depending on the choice of p1, some Wi,j’s will be estimated as exact zeros. A larger share
of parameters will be estimated as zeros if p1 increases. The penalization also shrinks non-zero
estimates towards zero. A second (adaptive) step provides improvements by re-weighting the
penalization by the inverse of the first-step estimates (Zou, 2006):
θˆ(p) = (1 + p2/T ) · arg min
θ∈Rp

gNT (θ)
′MTgNT (θ) + p∗1
∑
{i,j:W˜ij 6=0,
i,j=1,...,N,
i 6=j}
|Wi,j|
|W˜i,j|γ
+ p2
∑
{i,j:W˜ij 6=0,
i,j=1,...,N,
i 6=j}
|Wi,j|2

,
(10)
where W˜i,j is the (i, j)-th element of the first-step estimate of W , and we follow Caner and Zhang
(2014) to set γ = 2.5. Elements W˜i,j estimated as zeros in the first stage are kept as zero in the
second stage, because W˜i,j = 0 implies the effective penalization is infinite. We write p = (p1, p∗1, p2)
as the final set of penalization parameters. Conditional on p, the estimate of the Adaptive Elastic
Net GMM procedure is θˆ(p). Finally, we update the estimates of ρ0, β0 and γ0 on a regression
using peers-of-peers as instruments, similar to Bramoullé et al. (2009), but using the network as
estimated in (10). This final step is not necessary but performs better in small samples. As in
Caner and Zhang (2014, p. 35), the penalization parameters p are chosen by the BIC criterion.
This balances model fit with the number of parameters included in the model.22
In Appendix B.2 we provide further implementation details, including the choice of initial
conditions. Of course, other estimation methods are available and our identification results do not
hinge on any particular estimator. Our aim is to demonstrate the practical feasibility of using
the Adaptive Elastic Net estimator, rather than claim it is the optimal estimator.23 Indeed, in
Appendix B.3 we show how OLS can also be used to estimate θ if T is sufficiently large. This
makes precise the benefits of penalized estimation for any given T and highlights that sparsity is
not required for our identification results.
3.2 Simulations
We showcase the method using Monte Carlo simulations based both on stylized random network
structures as well as real world networks. We describe the simulation procedures, results and
22Following Caner and Zhang, 2014, the choice of p, which we denote as pˆ, is the one that minimizes
BIC(p) = log
[
gNT
(
θˆ(p)
)′
MT gNT
(
θˆ(p)
)]
+A
(
θˆ(p)
)
· log T
T
where A
(
θˆ(p)
)
counts the number of non-zero coefficients among {W1,2, . . . ,WN,N−1}. (See also Zou et al., 2007.)
23For example, Manresa (2016) also relies on a Lasso-related methodology but restricts ρ0 to be zero and so
ignores endogenous social effects. If instrumental variables are available, Lam and Souza (2016) propose estimating
(1) directly using the Adaptive Lasso and exploiting sparsity of the estimated W0. Gautier and Rose (2016) extend
the (identification-robust) Self-Tuning Instrumental Variable estimator in Gautier and Tsybakov (2014).
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robustness checks in more detail in the Appendix. Here we just provide a brief overview to
highlight how well the method works to recover social networks even in relatively short panels.
For each simulated network, we take a fixed network structure W0, and simulate panel data
as if the data generating process were given by (1). We then apply the method on the simulated
panel data to recover estimates of all elements in W0, as well as the endogenous and exogenous
social effect parameters (ρ0, γ0). Our result identifies entries in W0 and so naturally recovers links
of varying strength. It is long recognized that link strength might play an important role in social
interactions (Granovetter, 1973). Data limitations often force researchers to postulate some ties to
be weaker than others (say, based on interaction frequency). In contrast, our approach identifies
the continuous strength of ties, W0,ij, where W0,ij > 0 implies node j influences node i.
The stylized networks we consider are a random network, and a political party network in which
two groups of nodes each cluster around a central node. The real world networks we consider are
the high-school friendship network in Coleman (1964) from a small high school in Illinois, and
one of the village networks elicited in Banerjee et al. (2013) from rural Karnataka, India. These
networks vary in size, complexity, and their aggregate and node-level features. All four networks
are also sparse. For the stylized networks, we first assess the performance of the estimator for a
fixed network size, N = 30. We simulate the real-world networks using non-isolated nodes in each
(so N = 70 and 65 respectively).24
Despite the heterogeneity across network scenarios, the method performs well in all simulations.
Figure A1 shows the simulation results. Each Panel presents a different metric as we vary T for
each simulated network. Panel A shows that for each network, the proportion of zero entries in
W0 correctly estimated as zeros is above 90% even when exploiting a small number of time periods
(T = 5). The proportion approaches 100% as T grows. Conversely, Panel B shows the proportion
of non-zeros entries estimated as non-zeros is also high for small T . It is above 70% from T = 5
for the Erdos-Renyi network, being at least 85% across networks for T = 25, and increasing as T
grows. As discussed above, the Adaptive Elastic Net estimator is better in recovering true zero
entries because it is a well-known feature that shrinkage estimators tend to shrink small parameters
to zero.
Panels C and D show that for each simulated network, the mean absolute deviation between
estimated and true networks for Wˆ and Πˆ falls quickly with T and is close zero for large sample
sizes. Finally, Panels E and F show that biases in the endogenous and exogenous social effects
parameters, ρˆ and γˆ, also fall quickly in T . The fact that biases are not zero is as expected for
small T , being analogous to well-known results for autoregressive time series models.25
In the Appendix we show the robustness of the simulation results to: (i) varying network sizes
and node definitions in the real work network of Banerjee et al. (2013); (ii) alternative parameter
24As in Bramoullé et al., 2009, we exclude isolated nodes because they do not conform with row-sum normalization.
25The bias in spatial auto-regressive models with small number of observations even when the network is observed
is similarly documented by Mizruchi and Neuman (2008), Farber et al. (2009), Smith (2009), Neuman and Mizruchi
(2010), and Wang et al. (2014).
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choices and richening up the structure of shocks across nodes. We also demonstrate the gains from
using the Adaptive Elastic Net GMM estimator over alternative estimators, such as the Adaptive
Lasso estimator and OLS.
4 Application: Tax Competition Between US States
Our identification result can be used to shed new light on a classic social interactions problem:
tax competition between US states (Wilson, 1999). Since the seminal empirical studies in tax
competition between jurisdictions (Case et al., 1989; Case et al., 1993), it has been well-recognized
that defining competing ‘neighbors’ is the central empirical challenge, and theory cannot resolve the
issue. Two mechanisms have been argued to drive the structure of interactions across jurisdictions:
factor mobility and yardstick competition.
On factor mobility, Tiebout (1956) first argued that labor and capital can move in response to
differential tax rates across jurisdictions. Factor mobility leads naturally to the postulated social
interactions matrix being: (i) geographic neighbors given labor mobility; and (ii) jurisdictions with
similar economic or demographic characteristics, given capital mobility (Case et al., 1989).26
A second mechanism occurs through political economy channels (Shleifer, 1985). In particular,
yardstick competition between jurisdictions is driven by voters making comparisons between states
to learn about their own politician’s quality. Besley and Case (1995) formalize the idea in a
model where voters use taxes set by governors in neighboring states to infer their own governor’s
quality. This generates informational externalities across jurisdictions, forcing incumbents into
yardstick competition, where their tax setting behavior is determined by what other incumbents
do. Yardstick competition leads naturally to the postulated interactions matrix corresponding to
a matrix of ‘political neighbors’: other states that voters make comparisons to.
This application shows the practical use of our approach to recover social interactions in a
setting in which the number of nodes and time periods is relatively low: the data covers mainland
US states, N = 48, for years 1962-2015, T = 53. Our approach identifies the structure of social
interactions among ‘economic neighbors’, that we denote Wecon. We contrast this against a null
hypothesis that states are only influenced by their geographic neighbors, Wgeo, as postulated by
Besley and Case, 1995 and shown in Figure 1A. With Wecon recovered, we can establish, beyond
geography, what predicts the existence and strength of ties between states. Finally, relative to
Wgeo, we conduct simulations using Wecon to assess the equilibrium propagation of tax setting
shocks across mainland US states. Taken together, this body of evidence allows us to provide
novel insights related to the role of factor mobility and yardstick competition in driving tax setting
behavior across US states.
26A body of evidence finds that tax bases are mobile in response to tax differentials (Hines, 1996; Devereux and
Griffith, 1998; Kleven et al., 2013, 2014)
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4.1 Data and Empirical Specification
We denote state tax liabilities for state i in year t as τ it, covering state taxes collected from real per
capita income, sales and corporate taxes. We measure this using a series constructed from data
published annually in the Statistical Abstract of the United States. Our series covers mainland
states (N = 48) for years 1962-2015, (T = 53), therefore extending the sample used by Besley and
Case (1995), that runs from 1962-1988 (T = 26).27 The outcome considered, ∆τ it, is the change
in tax liabilities between years t and (t− 2) because it might take a governor more than a year to
implement a tax program. Their model implies a standard social interactions specification for the
tax setting behavior of state governors:
∆τ it = ρ
N∑
j=1
W0,ij∆τ jt + γ
N∑
j=1
W0,ijxjt + βxit + αi + αt + it. (11)
Tax setting behavior is thus determined by (i) endogenous social effects arising through neighbors’
tax changes (
∑N
j=1W0,ij∆τ jt); (ii) exogenous social effects arising through the economic/demographic
characteristics of neighbors (
∑N
j=1W0,ijxjt); (iii) state i’s characteristics (xit), that include income
per capita, the unemployment rate, and the proportion of young and elderly. All specifications
include state and time effects (αi, αt), so allowing for time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity
across states, and for common (macroeconomic) shocks. Due to the inclusion of the time effects
αt, we normalize the rows of Wecon to one. Table A7 presents descriptive statistics for the Besley
and Case (1995) sample and our extended sample.
Much of the earlier literature focuses on endogenous social effects and ignores exogenous social
effects by setting γ = 0. Our identification result allows us to relax this constraint and thus
estimate the full typology of social effects described by Manski (1993). This is important because
only endogenous social effects lead to social multipliers, and are crucial to identify as they can
lead to a race-to-the-bottom or sub-optimal public goods provision (Brennan and Buchanan, 1980;
Wilson, 1986; Oates and Schwab, 1988).
After estimating the neighborhood matrix, we follow Besley and Case (1995) and estimate the
model instrumenting for ∆τ jt using neighbors’ lagged change in income per capita, and neighbors’
lagged change in unemployment rate. These instruments are in the spirit of using exogenous social
effects to instrument for neighbor’s tax changes. However, given our approach allows us to estimate
exogenous social effects (γ 6= 0), these instruments will generally be weaker when estimating the
full specification in (11). We thus follow Bramoullé et al. (2009) and De Giorgi et al. (2010), and
also instrument neighbors’ tax changes with neighbor-of-neighbor characteristics.
27Besley and Case (1995) test their political agency model using a two equation set-up: (i) on gubernatorial
re-election probabilities; and (ii) on tax setting. Our application focuses on the latter because this represents a
social interaction problem. They use two tax series: (i) TAXSIM data (from the NBER) which runs from 1977-88;
and (ii) state tax liabilities series constructed from data published annually in the Statistical Abstract of the US
that runs from 1962-1988. All their results are robust to either series. We extend the second series.
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4.2 Preliminary Findings
Table 1 presents our preliminary findings and comparison to Besley and Case (1995). Column 1
shows OLS estimates of (11) where the postulated social interactions matrix is based on geographic
neighbors, exogenous social effects are ignored so γ = 0 and the panel includes all 48 mainland
states but runs only from 1962-1988 as in Besley and Case (1995). Social interactions influence
gubernatorial tax setting behavior: ρ̂OLS = .375. Column 2 shows this to be robust to instrument-
ing neighbors’ tax changes using the instrument set proposed by Besley and Case (1995). ρ̂2SLS is
more than double the magnitude of ρ̂OLS suggesting tax setting behaviors across jurisdictions are
strategic complements, and OLS estimates are heavily downward-biased.
Columns 3 and 4 replicate both specifications over the longer sample period we construct. The
evidence confirms Besley and Case’s (1995) finding on social interactions to be robust in a longer
sample period. We again note that ρ̂2SLS is more than double the magnitude of ρ̂OLS. The result
in Column 4 implies that for every dollar increase in the average tax rates among geographic
neighbors, a state increases its own taxes by 61 cents. This is similar to the headline estimate of
Besley and Case (1995).28
4.3 Endogenous and Exogenous Social Interactions (ρ and γ)
We now move beyond much of the earlier political economy and public economics literature to first
establish whether there are endogenous and exogenous social interactions in tax setting behavior.
We first focus on the endogenous and exogenous social interaction parameters, and in the next
subsection we detail the identified social interactions matrix, Wˆecon. Column 1 of Table 2 shows the
initial estimates obtained from the Adaptive Elastic Net procedure where γ = 0. Columns 2 and
3 show the resulting OLS and 2SLS estimates for ρ: ρ̂2SLS = .641 > ρ̂OLS = .378 > 0.29 Columns
4 to 6 estimate the full model in (11). Columns 5 and 6 show the OLS and 2SLS estimates of
ρ are smaller, and less precisely estimated when exogenous social effects are allowed. This is not
surprising given that the instrument set is based on neighbors’ characteristics, many of which are
directly controlled for in (11), thus reducing the effective variation induced by the instrument.
Hence, in Column 7, we report 2SLS estimates based on instruments using neighbor-of-neighbor
characteristics. This represents our preferred specification: ρ̂2SLS = .608 (with a standard error of
.220). This value also meets the requirements on ρ in Corollaries 3 and 4 for global identification.
In short, there is robust evidence of endogenous social interactions in tax setting behavior of
governors across states.30
28Nor is the magnitude very different from earlier work examining fiscal expenditure spillovers. For example,
Case et al. (1989) find that US state government levels of per-capita expenditures are significantly impacted by
the expenditures of their neighbors, with the size of the impact being that a one dollar increase in neighbors’
expenditures leads to an increase in own-state expenditures by seventy cents.
29We report robust standard errors and so do not adjust them for the fact that Wˆecon is estimated.
30Table A8 shows the full set of exogenous social effects (so Columns 1 to 4 refer to the same specifications as
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4.4 Identified Social Interactions Matrix (Wˆecon)
Figure 1B shows how the structure of economic (Wˆecon) and geographic networks (Wgeo) differ,
where connected edges imply that two states are linked in at least one direction (either state i
causally impacts state taxes in j, and/or vice versa). This comparison makes it clear whether
all states geographically adjacent to i matter for its tax setting behavior and whether there are
non-adjacent states that influence its tax rate.
The left-hand panel of Figure 1B shows the network of geographic neighbors (whose edges
are colored blue), onto which we have superimposed the edges that are not identified as links in
Wecon; these dropped edges are indicated in red. This first implies that not all geographically
adjacent states are relevant for tax setting behavior. The right-hand panel of Figure 1B adds new
edges identified in Wˆecon that are not part of Wgeo. These represent non-adjacent states through
which social interactions occur. This implies the existence of spatially dispersed social interactions
between states. The implication is that for tax-setting behavior, economic distance is imperfectly
measured if we simply assume that interactions depend only on geographical distance. As detailed
below, this has many implications for the economics of tax competition.
As Table 3 summarizes, Wgeo has 214 edges, while Wˆecon has only 144 edges. States are less
connected than implied by postulating geographic networks. Wˆecon and Wgeo have 79 edges in
common. However, Wgeo has 135 edges that are absent in Wˆecon. Hence, while geography remains
a key determinant of tax competition, the majority of geographical neighbors (135/214 = 63%)
are not relevant for tax setting. There are 65 edges that exist only in Wgeo, so although there are
fewer edges in Wˆecon, the identified social interactions are more spatially dispersed than under the
assumption of geographic networks. This is reflected in the far lower clustering coefficient in Wˆecon
than in Wgeo (.026 versus .194).31
4.5 Strength of Ties and Reciprocity
Our estimation strategy identifies the continuous strength of ties, W0,ij, where W0,ij > 0 is inter-
preted as state j influencing outcomes in state i. This is useful because recent developments in
tax competition theory, using insights from the social networks literature, suggest links need not
be reciprocal or of symmetric strength (Janeba and Osterleh, 2013).
Figure 2A shows the distribution of W0,ij’s across edges in Wˆecon (conditional on W0,ij > 0).
The strength of ties between pairs of states varies greatly. The mean strength of ties is .19, that
is higher than the median strength, .085, suggesting many weak ties. At the other end of the
Columns 4 to 7 in Table 2). Exogenous social effects operate through economic neighbors’ income per capita and
unemployment rate. Demographic characteristics of economic neighbors to state i do not impact its tax rate.
31The clustering coefficient is the frequency of the number of fully connected triplets over the total number of
triplets. Other metrics can also be used to provide a scalar comparison of Wgeo and Wˆecon. One way to do so is
to reshape both matrices as vectors of length (48 × 47) and to compute their correlation. Doing so, we obtain a
correlation coefficient of .322.
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distribution, the strongest 10% of ties have weight above .6.
On the reciprocity of ties, Table 3 reveals that only 29.2% of edges in Wˆecon are reciprocal (all
edges in Wgeo are reciprocal by construction). Hence, tax competition is both spatially disperse
and highly asymmetric. In most cases where tax setting in state i is influenced by taxes in state
j, the opposite is not true.
Panels B and C in Figure 2 illustrate this for California, indicating the strength of each tie
(Wˆecon,CA,j). Figure 2B shows the in-network for California: those states causally impacting tax-
setting in California. Some geographic neighbors to California influence its tax setting behavior
(Nevada and Oregon), although these ties are weak. On the other hand, non-adjacent states
influence California (Colorado, Maine), and these in-network ties are stronger than geographically
adjacent in-network ties. Figure 2C shows the out-network for California, again indicating each tie
strength (Wˆecon,i,CA): those states whose taxes are influenced by taxes in California. We see that
none of the geographic neighbors to California are influenced by its tax setting behavior, whereas
a number of non-adjacent states are influenced (including East Coast states such as Virginia, and
Southern states, such as Louisiana). When states are influenced by taxes in California, these ties
tend to be relatively strong: Wˆecon,i,CA > .19 for all five in-network ties.
Given common time shocks αt in (11), row-sum normalization is required and ensures
∑
jW0,ij =
1. Hence, for every state i there will be at least one economic neighbor state j∗ impacts it, so that
W0,ij∗ > 0. This just reiterates that social interactions matter. On the other hand, our procedure
imposes no restriction on the derived columns of Wˆecon. It could be that a state does not affect any
other state. Examining this possibility directly in Wˆecon, we see this occurs for Minnesota, New
Jersey, New Mexico, Vermont, and Wisconsin. These states have an out-degree of zero. Their tax
rates impact no other states.
Table 3 reports the degree distribution across all nodes (states), splitting for in-networks and
out-networks. In Wgeo, the in-degree is by construction equal to the out-degree, as all ties are
reciprocal. The greater sparsity of the network of economic neighbors is again reflected in the
degree distribution being lower for Wˆecon than for Wgeo. In Wˆecon the dispersion of in- and out-
degree networks is very different (as measured by the standard deviation), being near double for
the in-degree. This asymmetry in Wˆecon further suggests that some highly focal or influential states
drive tax setting behavior in other states.
Figures 3A and 3B show complete histograms for the in- and out-degree across states. The
histogram on the left is for in-degree, and shows that states under Wˆecon generally have lower
in-degree than under Wgeo. The states that are influenced by the highest number of other states
are Utah, Pennsylvania and Ohio. The histogram on the right for out-degree, shows the five states
described above that do not impact other states (Wisconsin, Vermont, New Mexico, New Jersey
and Minnesota). Delaware is an outlier influential state in its out-degree in determining tax setting
in other states: as discussed below, Delaware is a well-known potential tax haven.32
32Dyreng et al. (2013) find that taxes play an important role in determining whether firms locate subsidiaries in
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4.6 Factor Mobility or Yardstick Competition?
We conclude by presenting two strategies to shed light on whether factor mobility and yardstick
competition drive these social interactions: (i) exploiting information in the identified social inter-
actions matrix Wˆecon; (ii) following Besley and Case (1995), using gubernatorial re-election as an
indirect test of the relevance of yardstick competition.
In our first strategy we estimate the factors correlated with the existence/strength of links
between states i and j in Wˆecon using the following dyadic regression:
Wˆecon,ij = λ0 + λ1Xij + λ2Xi + λ3Xj + uij.
We discretize link strength so Wˆecon,ij ∈ {0, 1} and predict the existence of a link using a linear
probability model. We then estimate the correlates of link strength Wˆecon,ij ∈ [0, 1] using a Tobit
model. The elements Xij, Xi, and Xj correspond to characteristics of the pair of states (i, j), of
state i, and state j, respectively. Covariates are time-averaged over the sample period, and robust
standard errors are reported. The sample thus corresponds to N × (N − 1) = 48 × 47 = 2256
potential ij links that could have formed.
Table 4 presents the results. Column 1 controls only for whether states i and j are geographic
neighbors. This is highly predictive of a link between them. Columns 2 and 3 show that distance
between states also negatively correlates with them being linked, but that when both geographic
adjacency and distances are included, the former is more predictive. Hence, we control only for
whether i and j are geographic neighbors in the remaining Columns.
The next set of specifications use the insight that economic neighbors are likely to be based
on a mixture of similarity in geography, income per capita, and demography (Case et al., 1989).
Column 4 thus adds two Xij covariates to capture the economic and demographic homophily
between states i and j. GDP homophily is the absolute difference in the states GDP per capita.
Demographic homophily is the absolute difference of the share of young people (aged 5-17) plus
the absolute difference of the share of elderly people (aged 65+) across the states. GDP homophily
predicts ties, whereas demographic homophily does not.
Columns 5 to 7 then sequentially add in several sets of controls. For labor mobility, we use
net state-to-state migration data to control for the net migration flow of individuals from state i
to state i (defined as the flow from i to j minus the flow from j to i).33 We then add a political
Delaware: a Delaware-based state tax avoidance strategy lowers state effective tax rates by around 1 percentage
point. They also report that in June 2010, Delaware landed at the top of National Geographic magazine’s published
list of the most secretive tax havens in the world (ahead of foreign tax havens such as Luxembourg, Switzerland,
and the Cayman Islands).
33We also experimented with alternative measures of labor migration, and results were qualitatively the same.
State-to-state migration data are based on year-to-year address changes reported on individual income tax re-
turns filed with the IRS. The data cover filing years 1991 through 2015, and include the number of returns filed,
which approximates the number of households that migrated, the number of personal exemptions claimed, which
approximates the number of individuals who migrated. The data are available at https://www.irs.gov/statistics/soi-
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homophily variable between states. For any given year, this is set to one if a pair of states have
governors of the same political party. As this is time averaged over our sample, this element
captures the share of the sample period in which the states have governors of the same party.
Lastly, we include whether state j is considered a tax haven (and so might have disproportionate
influence on other states). Based on Findley et al. (2012), the following states are coded as tax
havens: Nevada, Delaware, Montana, South Dakota, Wyoming and New York. This corroborates
earlier evidence in Figure 3B, where Delaware, Wyoming and Nevada were among the states with
the highest out-degree.
The specification in Column 7 shows that with this full set of controls, geographic adjacency
remains a robust predictor of the existence of links between states. However, the identified economic
network highlights additional significant predictors of tax competition between states: political
homophily reduces the likelihood of a link, suggesting any yardstick competition driving social
interactions occurs when voters compare their governor to those of the opposing party in other
states. The tax haven states appear to be especially influential in the tax setting behaviors of other
states. The strong influence of tax haven states might lead to a race-to-the-bottom. Relative to
these factors, the economic and demographic similarity between states play an insignificant role in
determining interactions between states.
The final column considers the continuous link strength as an outcome and reports Tobit partial
average effect estimates. This reinforces that geography, political homophily, and tax haven status
all robustly correlate to the strength of influence states tax setting has on others. Labor mobility
between states does not robustly predict either the existence or strength of ties.
Our second strategy to investigate factor mobility and yardstick competition follows the in-
tuition of Besley and Case (1995). They suggest an indirect test of the relevance of yardstick
competition is that this mechanism only applies to governors not facing term limits. Therefore we
compare our main effects across two subsamples: state-years in which the governor can and cannot
run for reelection. The results are reported in Table 5. The 2SLS results suggest that in both
samples, endogenous social interaction effects exist, although they are more precisely estimated
when governors can run for re-election.
Taken together, our evidence suggests that both factor mobility (of both labor and capital,
as measured through the influence of tax havens), and yardstick competition (occurring through
comparisons to governors of the other party), are important mechanisms driving the existence and
strength of interactions in tax-setting behavior across US states.
Finally, in the Appendix, we contrast how shocks to tax setting in a given state propagate
under the identified interactions matrix Wˆecon, relative to what would have been predicted under a
postulated network structure based on Wgeo. As Wˆecon is spatially more dispersed than Wgeo, the
general equilibrium effects might be very different under the two network structures. We therefore
discuss the implications for tax inequality under Wˆecon and the Wgeo counterfactual.
tax-stats-migration-data (accessed September 2017).
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5 Discussion
In a canonical social interactions model, we provide sufficient conditions under which the social
interactions matrix, and endogenous and exogenous social effects are all globally identified, even
absent information on social links. Our identification strategy is novel, and may bear fruit in
other areas. We describe how high-dimensional estimation techniques can be used to estimate
the model based on the Adaptive Elastic Net GMM method. We showcase our method in Monte
Carlo simulations using two stylized and two real world networks: these highlight that even in
panels as short as T = 5, the majority of social ties can be correctly identified. Finally, we
employ this estimation strategy to provide novel insights in a classic social interactions problem:
tax competition across US states.
Our method is immediately applicable to other classic social interactions problems. For exam-
ple, in finance a long-standing question has been whether CEOs are subject to relative performance
evaluation, and if so, what is the comparison set of firms/CEOs used (Edmans and Gabaix, 2016).34
Other fields such as macroeconomics, political economy and trade are all obvious areas where so-
cial interactions across jurisdictions/countries etc. could drive key outcomes, panel data exist, and
the number of nodes is relatively fixed. Our approach can also be applied to new contexts where
social interactions determine economic behavior but data on social links is absent. Advances in
the availability of administrative data, data from social media or mobile technologies, and high
frequency data in finance and from online economic transactions, all offer new possibilities to iden-
tify social interactions. For example, van Vliet, 2018 studies the interconnectedness between the
largest financial institutions in during the 2008 financial crisis using readlily available market data,
in which N = 13 and T = 500.
Three further directions for future research are of note. First, under partial observability of
W0 (as in Blume et al., 2015), the number of parameters in W0 to be retrieved falls quickly. Our
approach can then still be applied to complete knowledge of W0, and this could be achieved with
potentially weaker assumptions for identification, and in even shorter panels. To illustrate possi-
bilities, Figure 4 shows results from a final simulation exercise in which we assume the researcher
starts with partial knowledge ofW0. We do so for the Banerjee et al. (2013) village family network,
showing simulation results for scenarios in which the researcher knows the social ties of the three
(five, ten) households with the highest out-degree. For comparison we also show the earlier sim-
ulation results when W0 is entirely unknown. This clearly illustrates that with partial knowledge
34Edmans and Gabaix (2016) overview the theory and empirics of executive compensation. Applying the infor-
mativeness principle in contract theory to CEO pay suggests peer performance is informative about the degree to
which firm value is due to high CEO effort or luck. In a first generation of studies, Aggarwal and Samwick (1999)
and Murphy (1999) showed that CEO pay is determined by absolute, rather than relative performance. However,
this conclusion has been challenged by others such as Gong et al. (2011) who argue these conclusions arise from
identifying relative performance evaluation (RPE) based on an implicit approach, assuming a peer group (e.g. based
on industry and/or size). Indeed, when Gong et al. (2011) study the explicit use of RPE, based on the disclosure
of peer firms and performance measures mandated by the SEC in 2006, they actually find that 25% of S&P 1500
firms explicitly using RPE. We are currently working on using our method to provide novel evidence on the matter.
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of the social network, performance on all metrics improves rapidly for any given T .
Second, we have developed our approach in the context of the canonical linear social interactions
model (1). This builds on Manski (1993) when W0 is known to the researcher, and the reflection
problem is the main challenge in identifying endogenous and exogenous social effects. However, as
established in Blume et al. (2011) and Blume et al. (2015), the reflection problem is functional-form
dependent and may not apply to many non-linear models. An important topic for future research
is thus to extend the insights gathered here to non-linear social interaction settings.
Finally, our approach has taken the network structure as predetermined and fixed. Clearly, an
important part of the social networks literature examines endogenous network formation (Jackson
et al., 2017; de Paula, 2017). Our analysis allows us to begin probing the issue in two ways. First,
the kind of dyadic regression analysis in Section 4 on the correlates of entries in W0,ij suggests fac-
tors driving link formation and dissolution. Second, it is possible to examine whether the identified
social interactions matrix is stable over time. To illustrate the possibility in a real world setting,
we extend our application on tax competition to investigate the stability of Wˆecon by running the
procedure in two subsamples, each with T = 26 periods: 1962-88 and 1989-2015. Panels A and
B in Figure 5 shows the resulting estimated economic networks in each subsample, and Panel C
provides network statistics for each subsample panel (as well as for the earlier estimated economic
network and the network based on geographic neighbors). This highlights that the network struc-
ture of tax competition has changed over time, with the later sample network from 1989-2015
having fewer edges, fewer reciprocated edges, lower clustering and lower degree distribution.
This analysis leads naturally to a broad agenda going forward, to address the challenge of
simultaneously identifying and estimating time varying models of network formation and social
interaction, all in cases where data on social networks is not required.
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A Proofs
Theorem 1
Proof. The local identification result follows Rothenberg (1971). Under the assumptions in our
model, the parameter space Θ ⊂ Rm is an open set (recall that m = N(N − 1) + 3.) This
corresponds to Assumption I in Rothenberg (1971).
We have that,
∂Π
∂Wij
= ρ (I − ρW )−1 ∆ij (I − ρW )−1 (βI + γW ) + (I − ρW )−1 γ∆ij
∂Π
∂ρ
= (I − ρW )−1W (I − ρW )−1 (βI + γW )
∂Π
∂γ
= (I − ρW )−1W
∂Π
∂β
= (I − ρW )−1 ,
where ∆ij is the N × N matrix with 1 in the (i, j)-th position and zero elsewhere. Write the
N2 × m derivative matrix ∇Π ≡ ∂vec(Π)∂θ′ . By assumption, row i in matrix W sums up to one,
incorporated through the restriction that ϕ ≡ ∑Nj=1,j 6=iWij − 1 = 0, for the unit-normalised row
i. The derivative of the restriction ϕ is the m-dimensional vector ∇′W ≡ ∂ϕ∂θ′ =
[
e′i ⊗ ι′N−1 01×3
]
(where ei is an N -dimensional vector with 1 in the ith component and zero, otherwise). Following
Theorem 6 of Rothenberg (1971), the structural parameters θ ∈ Θ are locally identified if, and
only if, the matrix ∇ ≡ [∇′Π ∇′W ]′ has rank m.35
If ∇ is does not have rank m, there is a nonzero vector c ≡ (cW12 , . . . , cWN,N−1 , cρ, cγ, cβ)′ such
that ∇ · c = 0. This implies that
cW12
∂Π
∂W12
+ · · ·+ cWN,N−1
∂Π
∂WN,N−1
+ cρ
∂Π
∂ρ
+ cγ
∂Π
∂γ
+ cβ
∂Π
∂β
= 0 (12)
35For a parameter vector to be locally identified, Rothenberg (1971) requires that the derivative matrix ∇ have
rank m at that point and that this vector be (rank-)regular. A (rank-)regular point of the parameter space is one
for which there is a neighborhood where the rank of ∇ is constant (see Definition 4 in Rothenberg, 1971). Because
we show that the derivative matrix has rank m at every point in the parameter space, this also guarantees that
every point in the parameter space is (rank-)regular.
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and, for the unit-normalized row i (see A4),∑
j 6=i,j=1,...,n
cWij = 0. (13)
Premultiplying equation (12) by (I − ρW ) and substituting the derivatives,
N∑
i,j=1,i 6=j
cWij
[
ρ∆ij (I − ρW )−1 (βI + γW ) + γ∆ij
]
+
+cρW (I − ρW )−1 (βI + γW ) + cγW + cβI = 0.
Define C ≡∑Ni,j=1,i 6=j cWij∆ij. Since the spectral radius of ρW is strictly less than one by A2, one
can show (by representing (I − ρW )−1 as a Neumann series, for instance) that (βI + γW ) and
(I − ρW )−1 commute. Then, the expression above is equivalent to
ρC (βI + γW ) (I − ρW )−1 + γC + cρW (βI + γW ) (I − ρW )−1 + cγW + cβI = 0.
Post-multiplying by (I − ρW ), we obtain
ρC (βI + γW ) + γC (I − ρW ) + cρW (βI + γW ) + cγW (I − ρW ) + cβ (I − ρW ) = 0
which, upon rearrangement, yields
(γ + ρβ)C + cβI + (βcρ − cβρ+ cγ)W + (cργ − ρcγ)W 2 = 0. (14)
Because Cii = 0 andWii = 0 (by A1), we have that cβ +(cργ − ρcγ) (W 2)ii = 0 for all i = 1, . . . , N .
Since by assumption A5 there isn’t a constant κ such that diag (W 20 ) = κι, then cβ = cργ−ρcγ = 0.
Plugging back in (14), we obtain
(γ + ρβ)C + (βcρ + cγ)W = 0.
which implies that C = −βcρ+cγ
γ+ρβ
W since γ + ρβ 6= 0 by assumption A3. Taking the sum of the
elements in row i, we get
(γ + ρβ)
∑
j 6=i,j=1,...,n
cWij + (βcρ + cγ) = 0.
Note that, by equation (13),
∑
j 6=i,j=1,...,n cWij = 0. So βcρ + cγ = 0 and C = −βcρ+cγγ+ρβ W = 0. This
implies that cWij = 0 for any i and j. Combining βcρ + cγ = 0 with cργ − ρcγ = 0 obtained above,
we get that cρ (ρβ + γ) = 0. Since ρβ + γ 6= 0, then cρ = 0. Given that βcρ + cγ = 0, it follows
that cγ = 0. This shows that θ ∈ Θ is locally identified.
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Corollary 1
Proof. The parameter θ0 being locally identified (see Theorem 1) implies that the set {θ : Π(θ) =
Π(θ0)} is discrete. If it is also compact, then the set is finite. To establish that we now show that
Π is a proper function: the inverse image Π−1(K) of any compact set K ⊂ Rm is also compact
(see Krantz and Parks, 2013, p.124).
Let A be a compact set in the space of N × N real matrices. Since it is a compact set in
a finite dimensional space, it is closed and bounded. Since Π is a continuous function of θ, the
pre-image of a compact set, which is closed, is also closed. BecauseW is bounded and ρ ∈ (−1, 1),
their corresponding coordinates in θ ∈ Π−1(A) are bounded. Suppose the coordinates for β or γ in
θ ∈ Π−1(A) are not bounded. So one can find a sequence (θk)∞k=1 such that |βk| → ∞ or |γk| → ∞.
Denote the Frobenius norm of the matrix A as ‖A‖. By the submultiplicative property ‖AB‖ ≤
‖A‖ · ‖B‖,
‖βI + γW‖ ≤ ∥∥(βI + γW ) (I − ρW )−1∥∥ · ‖I − ρW‖ .
Note that (I − ρW )−1 and (βI + γW ) commute, and so
∥∥(βI + γW ) (I − ρW )−1∥∥ = ∥∥(I − ρW )−1 (βI + γW )∥∥ = ‖Π‖ .
It follows that
‖βI + γW‖
‖I − ρW‖ ≤ ‖Π‖ .
Given W has zero main diagonal,
‖βI + γW‖2 = β2 ‖I‖2 + γ2 ‖W‖2 = β2N + γ2 ‖W‖2 .
Also, ‖I − ρW‖2 = N + ρ2 ‖W‖2 ≤ N + ρ2C, for some constant C ∈ R, since W is bounded by
assumption A2. We then have that√
β2N + γ2 ‖W‖2√
N + ρ2C
≤ ‖Π‖ .
Since |ρ| < 1 by Assumption (A2) the denominator above is bounded. Hence |βk| → ∞ ⇒
‖Π(θk)‖ → ∞. We now use the fact that
∑
jWij = 1 to show that there is a lower bound on
‖W‖2, and so |γk| → ∞ ⇒ ‖Π(θk)‖ → ∞. To see this, note that
min
s.t.
∑
jWij=1
‖W‖2 ≥ min
s.t.
∑
jWij=1
N∑
j=1
W 2ij.
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The Lagrangean for the right-hand side minimization problem is:
L (Wi1, . . . ,Wi,i−1,Wi,i+1, . . . ,WiN ;µ) =
N∑
j=1
W 2ij − µ
(∑
j
Wij − 1
)
.
where µ is the Lagrangean multiplier for the normalisation constraint. The first-order conditions
for this convex minimization problem are:
∂L
∂Wij
= 2Wij − µ = 0, for any j 6= i
∂L
∂µ
=
N∑
j=1
Wij − 1 = 0.
The first equation implies that Wij = µ2 for j = 1, . . . , i − 1, i + 1, . . . , N . Using the fact that
Wii = 0, the second equation implies that µ = 2/(N − 1). We have then that Wij = 1N−1 , j 6= i
and, consequently, ‖W‖2 ≥ (N − 1) 1
(N−1)2 =
1
N−1 . Hence, if |γk| → ∞, the numerator in the lower
bound for ‖Π‖ above also goes to infinity. Consequently, A would not be compact.
Therefore, if A is compact the coordinates in θ ∈ Π−1(A) corresponding to β and γ are also
bounded. Hence, Π−1(A) is bounded (and closed). Consequently it is compact.
For a given reduced form parameter matrix Π, the set {θ : Π(θ) = Π(θ0)} is then compact.
Since it is also discrete, it is finite.
The following lemmas are used in proving Theorem 2.
Lemma 1. Assume (A1)-(A5). If γ0 = 0, W0 is such that (W0)1,2 = (W0)2,1 = 1 and (W0)ij = 0
otherwise, with ρ0 6= 0 and β0 6= 0, then θ0 ∈ Θ is identified.
Proof. Take θ = (W12, . . . ,WN,N−1, ρ, γ, β) ∈ Θ possibily different from θ0 such that the models
are observationally equivalent, so Π0 = Π. Then
(I − ρ0W0)−1(β0I + γ0W0) = (I − ρW )−1(βI + γW ).
Since γ0 = 0 and (I − ρW )−1 and (βI + γW ) commute (see the proof for Theorem 1), it follows
that
Π0 = Π ⇔ β0(I − ρ0W0)−1 = (βI + γW )(I − ρW )−1
or, equivalently,
β0(I − ρW ) = (I − ρ0W0)(βI + γW ).
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This last equation implies that
(β0 − β)I − (γ + β0ρ)W + ρ0βW0 + ρ0γW0W = 0. (15)
We first note that (W0W )N,N = 0 since (W0)N,i = 0 for any 1 ≤ i ≤ N and, by Assumption (A1),
(W )N,N = (W0)N,N = 0. So β0 = β. Taking elements (i, j) such that i ≥ 3 and i 6= j in equation
(15), and using the fact that β0 = β, we find that −(γ + β0ρ)(W )ij = −(γ + βρ)(W )ij = 0 for any
(i, j) such that i ≥ 3 and i 6= j. By Assumption (A3), γ + βρ 6= 0 and it follows that (W )ij = 0
for any (i, j) such that i ≥ 3 and i 6= j. In fact, since (W )i,i = 0 by Assumption (A1), we get that
(W )ij = 0 for any (i, j) such that i ≥ 3.
Using Assumption (A1) and since β0 = β, elements (1, 1) and (2, 2) in equation (15) imply
that ρ0γ(W )2,1 = ρ0γ(W )1,2 = 0. Given that ρ0 6= 0, we get that γ(W )2,1 = γ(W )1,2 = 0.
From element (1, 2) in equation (15) we find that −(γ + β0ρ)(W )1,2 + ρ0β = 0 or, equivalently,
(ρ0−ρ(W )1,2)β0−γ(W )1,2 = 0. Given that γ(W )1,2 = 0 and β0 6= 0, it must be that ρ0−ρ(W )1,2 =
0. Making the analogous argument for element (2, 1), we would also obtain that ρ0− ρ(W )2,1 = 0.
If both (W )1,2 and (W )2,1 are equal to zero, using the fact that Wij = 0 for any (i, j) such that
i ≥ 3, we would then obtain that W 2 is equal to
0 0 (W )1,3 · · · (W )1,N
0 0 (W )2,3 · · · (W )2,N
0 0 0 · · · 0
...
...
... . . .
...
0 0 0 · · · 0

2
=

0 0 0 · · · 0
0 0 0 · · · 0
0 0 0 · · · 0
...
...
... . . .
...
0 0 0 · · · 0

,
which contradicts Assumption (A5). Hence (W )1,2 6= 0 or (W )2,1 6= 0. If (W )1,2 6= 0, using the
fact that γ(W )1,2 = 0, we get that γ = 0. Equivalently, if (W )2,1 6= 0, and using the fact that
γ(W )2,1 = 0, we again get that γ = 0. So, in either case, γ = γ0 = 0.
Taking element (1, j) in equation (15), with j ≥ 3, we get that −(γ + ρβ0)W1,j + γρ0(W )2,j =
−ρβ0W1,j = 0. Similarly, element (2, j), with j ≥ 3 implies that −(γ + ρβ0)W2,j + γρ0(W )1,j =
−ρβ0W2,j = 0. Then, from −ρβ0(W )1,j = −ρβ0(W )2,j = 0 for j ≥ 3, it follows that −ρ(W )1,j =
−ρ(W )2,j = 0 since β0 6= 0.
From ρ0 − ρ(W )1,2 = 0, if (W )1,2 6= 0, we get that ρ = ρ0/(W )1,2 6= 0. Equivalently, if
(W )2,1 6= 0, we get that ρ = ρ0/(W )2,1 6= 0. Since (W )1,2 6= 0 or (W )2,1 6= 0, we obtain that ρ 6= 0.
Then, because −ρ(W )1j = ρ(W )2j = 0 for j ≥ 3, we have that (W )1j = (W )2j = 0 for j ≥ 3.
Given that ρ0−ρ(W )1,2 = 0, ρ0−ρ(W )2,1 = 0 and ρ 6= 0, we obtain that (W )1,2 = (W )2,1 = ρ0ρ .
Since (W )1,j = 0 for j 6= 2, (W )2,j = 0 for j 6= 1 and (W )ij = 0 for i ≥ 3, by Assumption
(A5) we get that (W )1,2 = (W )2,1 = 1 and ρ = ρ0. Hence, ((W )1,2, . . . , (W )N,N−1, ρ, γ, β) =
((W0)1,2, . . . , (W0)N,N−1, ρ0, γ0, β0).
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Lemma 2. Assume (A1)-(A2) and (A4)-(A5). The image of Π(·), for θ ∈ Θ+, is path-connected
and, therefore, connected.
Proof. Take θ and θ∗ ∈ Θ+. Consider first the subvectors corresponding to the adjacency matrices
W and W ∗. Without loss of generality, let 1, . . . , N be ordered such that (W 2)11 > (W 2)22. Con-
sider the adjacency matrix W∗ corresponding to the network of directed connections {(1, 2), (2, 1)}
and {(3, 4), (4, 5), . . . , (N − 1, N), (N, 3)}:
W∗ =

0 1 0 0 · · · 0
1 0 0 0 · · · 0
0 0 0 1 · · · 0
...
...
... . . . . . .
...
0 0 1 0 · · · 0

.
Note that diag(W 2∗ ) = (1, 1, 0, . . . , 0) and this is an admissible adjacency matrix under assumptions
(A1)-(A2) and (A4)-(A5). We first show that W is path-connected to W∗.
Consider the path given by
W (t) = tW∗ + (1− t)W
which implies that
(W (t)2)11 = (1− t)2(W 2)11 + t2 + (1− t)t(W12 +W21)
(W (t)2)22 = (1− t)2(W 2)22 + t2 + (1− t)t(W12 +W21).
Since (W (t)2)11 − (W (t)2)22 = (1 − t)2[(W 2)11 − (W 2)22] > 0 for t ∈ [0, 1) and W (1) = W∗,
(A5) is satisfied for any matrix W (t) such that t ∈ [0, 1]. Since all rows in W∗ sum to one and
(W∗)ii = 0 for any i, it is straightforward to see that W (t) also satisfies (A1) and (A4). Finally,∑N
j=1 |Wij(t)| ≤ t
∑N
j=1 |(W∗)ij| + (1− t)
∑N
j=1 |Wij| ≤ 1 for every i = 1, . . . , N and W (t) satisfies
Assumption (A2).
If W ∗ is such that (W ∗2)11 6= (W ∗2)22, the convex combination of W ∗ and W∗ is also seen to
satisfy (A1)-(A2) and (A4)-(A5) and a path between W and W ∗ can be constructed via W∗. If,
on the other hand (W ∗2)11 = (W ∗2)22, suppose without loss of generality that (W ∗2)11 6= (W ∗2)33.
In this case, one can construct a path between W ∗ and W∗∗ where W∗∗ represents the network of
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directed connections {(1, 3), (3, 1)} and {(2, 4), (4, 5), . . . , (N − 1, N), (N, 2)}:
W∗∗ =

0 0 1 0 · · · 0
0 0 0 1 · · · 0
1 0 0 0 · · · 0
...
...
... . . . . . .
...
0 1 0 0 · · · 0

.
Like W (t) above, this path can be seen to satisfy assumptions (A1)-(A2) and (A4)-(A5). Now
note that a path can also be constructed between W∗ and W∗∗ as their convex combination also
satisfies (A1)-(A2) and (A4)-(A5). For example, note that Wˆ (t) = tW∗ + (1− t)W∗∗ is such that
(Wˆ (t)2)11 = t
2 + (1 − t)2 and (Wˆ (t)2)NN = 0 so (Wˆ (t)2)11 − (Wˆ (t)2)NN > 0 for any t ∈ (0, 1)
and both Wˆ (0) and Wˆ (1) satisfy (A5). Hence, we can construct a path W (t) between W and W ∗
through W∗ and W∗∗.
Furthermore, ρ(t) = tρ∗+(1−t)ρ, β(t) = (tρ∗β∗+(1−t)ρβ)/(tρ∗+(1−t)ρ), γ(t) = tγ∗+(1−t)γ
are such that
f(t) ≡ ρ(t)β(t) + γ(t) = t(ρ∗β∗ + γ∗) + (1− t)(ρβ + γ) > 0,
since θ∗ and θ ∈ Θ+. (Note also that |ρ(t)| < 1 so Assumption (A2) is satisfied.) These facts taken
together imply that
θ(t) ≡ (W (t)12, . . . ,W (t)N,N−1, ρ(t), γ(t), β(t)) ∈ Θ+.
That is, Θ+ is path-connected and therefore connected. Since Π(·) is continuous on Θ+, Π(Θ+) is
connected.
Theorem 2
Proof. The proof uses Corollary 1.4 in Ambrosetti and Prodi (1995, p. 46),36 which we reproduce
here with our notation for convenience: Suppose the function Π(·) is continuous, proper and locally
invertible with a connected image. Then the cardinality of Π−1(Π) is constant for any Π in the
image of Π(·).
The mapping Π(θ) is continuous and proper (by Corollary 1), with connected image (Lemma
2), and non-singular Jacobian at any point (as per the proof for Theorem 1) which guarantees local
invertibility. Following Corollary 1.4 in Ambrosetti and Prodi (1995, p.46) reproduced above, we
obtain that the cardinality of the pre-image of Π(θ) is finite and constant. Take θ ∈ Θ+ such that
36Related results can be found in Ambrosetti and Prodi (1972) and de Marco et al. (2014)
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γ = 0, (W )1,2 = (W )2,1 = 1 and (W )i,j = 0 otherwise, with ρ 6= 0 and β 6= 0. By Lemma 1, that
cardinality is one.
Corollary 3
Proof. Since ρ ∈ (0, 1) and Wij ≥ 0,
∑∞
k=1 ρ
k−1W k is a non-negative matrix. By (5), the off-
diagonal elements of Π(θ) are equal to the off-diagonal elements of (ρβ + γ)
∑∞
k=1 ρ
k−1W k, the
sign of those elements identifies the sign of ρβ + γ. By Theorem 2, the model is identified.
Corollary 4
Proof. Since W0 is non-negative and irreducible, there is a real eigenvalue equal to the spectral
radius of W0 corresponding to the unique eigenvector whose entries can be chosen to be strictly
positive (i.e., all the entries share the same sign). A generic eigenvalue of W0, λ0, corresponds to
an eigenvalue of Π0 according to:
λΠ0 = β0 + (ρ0β0 + γ0)
λ0
1− ρ0λ0
If λ0 = a0 + b0i where a0, b0 ∈ R and i =
√−1, then
λΠ0 = β0 + (ρ0β0 + γ0)
a0(1− ρ0a0)− ρ0b20
(1− ρ0a0)2 + ρ20b20
+ (ρ0β0 + γ0)
b0
(1− ρ0a0)2 + ρ20b20
i.
If the eigenvalue λ0 is real, b0 = 0 and the corresponding λΠ0 eigenvalue is also real. Differentiating
Re(λΠ0), the real part of λΠ0 , with respect to Re(λ0) = a0, we get:
∂Re(λΠ0)
∂a0
=
(1− ρ0a0)2 − ρ20b20
[(1− ρ0a0)2 + ρ20b20]2
× (ρ0β0 + γ0). (16)
If the eigenvalue λ0 is real, the expression (16) becomes:
∂Re(λΠ0)
∂a0
=
∂λΠ0
∂a0
=
1
(1− ρ0a0)2
× (ρ0β0 + γ0).
The fraction multiplying ρ0β0 + γ0 is positive. If ρ0β0 + γ0 < 0, the real eigenvalues of Π0 are
decreasing on the real eigenvalues of W0. Consequently, the eigenvector corresponding to the
largest (real) eigenvalue of W0 will be associated with smallest real eigenvalue of Π0. If, on the
other hand, ρ0β0 + γ0 > 0 the eigenvector corresponding to the largest real eigenvalue of W0 will
correspond to the largest real eigenvalue of Π0. Since that eigenvector is the unique eigenvector
that can be chosen to have strictly positive entries, the sign of ρ0β0 + γ0 is identified by the
λΠ0 eigenvalue it is associated with and whether it is the largest or smallest real eigenvalue. By
Theorem 2, the model is identified.
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If there is only one real eigenvalue, note that the denominator in the fraction in (16) is positive.
The minimum value of the numerator subject to |λ0|2 = a20 + b20 ≤ 1 is given by
min
a0,b0
(1− ρ0a0)2 − ρ2b20 s.t. a20 + b20 ≤ 1.
The Lagrangean for this minimization problem is given by:
L (a0, b0;µ) = (1− ρ0a0)2 − ρ2b20 + µ(a20 + b20 − 1).
where µ is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the constraint a20 + b20 ≤ 1. The Kuhn-Tucker
necessary conditions for the solution (a∗0, b∗0, µ∗) of this problem are given by:
(∂a0 :) ρ0(1− ρ0a∗0)− µ∗a∗0 = 0
(∂b0 :) (ρ
2
0 − µ∗)b∗0 = 0
µ∗(a∗20 + b
∗2
0 − 1) = 0
a∗20 + b
∗2
0 ≤ 1 and µ∗ ≥ 0,
Let ρ0 6= 0. (Otherwise, the objective function above is equal to one irrespective of a0 or b0 and the
partial derivative is ρ0β0 + γ0.) If µ∗ = 0, ∂b0 implies that b∗0 = 0. Then ∂a0 would have a∗0 = ρ
−1
0
which violates a∗20 + b∗20 ≤ 1.
Hence, a solution should have µ∗ > 0. In this case, there are two possibilities: b∗0 = 0 or
b∗0 6= 0. If b∗0 6= 0, condition ∂b0 implies that µ∗ = ρ20 and ∂a0 then gives a∗0 = (2ρ0)−1. Because the
constraint is binding, b∗20 = 1− (4ρ20)−1. In this case, a∗20 ≤ 1 and b∗20 ≥ 0 requires that |ρ0| ≥ 1/2.
The value of the minimised objective function in this case 1/2−ρ20. This is positive if |ρ0| <
√
2/2.
The other possibility is to have b0 = 0. Because the constraint is binding, a0 = 1 and the
objective function takes the value (1− ρ0)2 > 0. Since (1− ρ0)2− 1/2 + ρ20 = 2ρ20− 2ρ0 + 1/2 ≥ 0,
this solution is dominated by the previous one when |ρ0| ≥ 1/2.
Consequently, the fraction multiplying ρ0β0 +γ0 is non-negative and it can be ascertained that
sgn
[
∂Re(λΠ0)
∂a0
]
= sgn[ρ0β0 + γ0]
as long as |ρ0| <
√
2/2.
If ρ0β0 + γ0 < 0, the real part of the eigenvalues of Π0 is decreasing on the real part of the
eigenvalues of W0. Consequently, the eigenvector corresponding to the eigenvalue of W0 with the
largest real part will correspond to the eigenvalue of Π0 with the smallest real part. If, on the
other hand, ρ0β0 + γ0 > 0 the eigenvector corresponding to the eigenvalue of W0 with the largest
real part will correspond to the eigenvalue of Π0 with the largest real part. Since that eigenvector
is the unique eigenvector that can be chosen to have strictly positive entries, the sign of ρ0β0 + γ0
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is identified by the λΠ0 eigenvalue it is associated with.
By Theorem 2, the model is identified.
Proposition 1
Proof. From equation (6) we observed that Π0vj = λΠ0,jvj, where vj is an eigenvector of both W0
and Π0 with corresponding eigenvalue λΠ0,j =
β0+γ0λ0,j
1−ρ0λ0,j . Defining c as the row-sum of Π0, we also
have that
Π˜0(I −H)vj = (I −H)Π0(I −H)vj = (I −H)Π0vj − (I −H)Π0Hvj
= λΠ0,j(I −H)vj − (I −H)cHvj = λΠ0,j(I −H)vj − (H −H2)cvj
= λΠ0,j(I −H)vj − (H −H)cvj = λΠ0,j(I −H)vj,
where the third equality obtains from Π0H = cH and the fifth equality holds sinceH is idempotent.
So Π˜0 and Π0 have common eigenvalues, with corresponding eigenvector v˜j = vj− v¯jι for Π˜0, where
v¯j =
1
N
ι′vj, j = 1, . . . , N . Since λΠ0,j and v˜j are observed from Π˜0, identification of Π0 is equivalent
to identification of v¯j (given diagonilizability).
To establish identification of v¯j, note thatW0(v˜j + v¯jι) = λ0,j(v˜j + v¯jι) since vj is an eigenvector
of W0. Consider an alternative constant v¯∗j 6= v¯j that satisfies the previous equation. Then
W0ι(v¯j − v¯∗j ) = λ0,j(v¯j − v¯∗j ).
Since W0ι = ι, vj must satisfy (1− λ0,j)(v¯j − v¯∗j ) = 0. For j = 2, . . . , N , |λ0,j| < 1. So v¯j = v¯∗j and
therefore identified. For j = 1, it is known that λ1 = 1 with eigenvector v1 = ι.
Proposition 2
Proof. Under row-sum normalization and |ρ0| < 1, (I − ρ0W0)−1ι = ι + ρ0W0ι + ρ20W 20 ι + · · · =
ι+ρ0ι+ρ
2
0ι+ · · · = ι 11−ρ0 , so Π01 ≡ (I−ρ0W )
−1 has constant row-sums. If row-sum normalization
fails, Π01 may not have constant row-sums. Define hij as the (ij)-th element of H˜. The first row
of the system (I − H˜)(I − ρ0W )−1ι = (I − H˜)rW0 = 0 is h∗11rW0,1 − h12rW0,2 − · · · − h1NrW0,N = 0
where h∗11 = 1−h11 and rW0,l is the l-th element of rW0 . If there are N possibleW0,W (1)0 , . . . ,W (n)0 ,
such that [r
W
(1)
0
· · · r
W
(N)
0
] has rank N , then h∗11 = h12 = · · · = h1N = 0. Since the same reasoning
applies to all rows, H˜ is the trivial transformation H˜ = I.
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B Estimation
B.1 Sparsity of W0 and Π0
Define M˜ as the number of non-zero elements of Π0. We say that Π0 is sparse if M˜  NT . Denote
the number of connected pairs in W0 via paths of any length as m˜c. We equivalently say that W0
is "sparse connected" if m˜c  NT . We show that sparsity of Π0 is related to sparse connectedness
of W0.
Proposition 3. Π0 is sparse if, and only if, the number of unconnected pairs W0 is large.
Proof. For |ρ0| < 1, we have that
Π0 = β0I + (ρ0β0 + γ0)
∞∑
k=1
ρk−10 W
k
0 .
Given that ρ0β0 + γ0 6= 0, it follows directly that [Π0]ij = 0 if, and only if, there are no paths
between i and j inW0. Therefore, sparsity of Π0 translates into a large number of (i, j) unconnected
pairs in W0.
On the one hand, sparsity does not imply sparse connectedness. A circular graph is clearly
sparse, but all nodes connect with all other nodes through a path of length at most N
2
. On the
other hand, the sparse connectedness implies sparsity and therefore is a stronger requirement.
To see this, take any arbitrary network G with m˜ (G) non-zero elements and m˜c (G) connected
pairs. Now consider the operation of “completing” G: for every connected (i, j) pair, add a direct
link between (i, j) if non-existent in G and denote the resulting matrix as C (G). It is clear that
m˜ (G) ≤ m˜ (C (G)). Yet, m˜ (C (G)) = m˜c (G).
B.2 Adaptive Elastic Net
B.2.1 Implementation and Initial Conditions
To make our procedure robust to the choice of initial condition, we use the particle swarm algo-
rithm. This is an optimization algorithm tailored to more aptly find global optima, which does
not depend on choice of initial conditions. It works as follows. The procedure starts from a large
number of initial conditions covering the parameter space, known as “particles” (Kennedy and
Eberhart, 1995). Each particle is iterated independently until convergence. The algorithm returns
45
the optimum calculated across particles.37,38
To ensure compliance with row-sum normalization for each row i ofW , one non-zero parameter
Wi,j∗ is set to 1 −
∑N
j=1,j 6=j∗Wi,j. This avoids making use of constrained optimization routines.
39
We also impose the restriction that ρ ≥ 0 and Wij ≥ 0 by minimizing the objective function with
respect to ρ˜ with ρ = ρ˜2 and W˜ij with Wij = W˜ 2ij.
Optimization of (8) starts from the initial condition selected by the particle swarm algorithm
and is minimized with respect to the parameters that were neither set to zero nor were chosen to
ensure row-sum normalization. Estimates from the first stage are subsequently used to adjust the
penalization, as in the Adaptive Elastic Net GMM objective function (10).40 The steps above are
repeated for different combinations of p = (p1, p∗1, p2), selected on a grid. The final estimate is the
one that minimizes the BIC criterion.
B.3 OLS
For the purpose of estimation, it is convenient to write the model in the stacked form. Let
x = [x1, . . . , xT ]
′ be the T × N matrix of explanatory variables, yi = [yi1, . . . , yiT ]′ be the T × 1
vector of response variables for individual i and pi0i = [pi0i1, . . . , pi0iN ]
′ where pi0ij is a short notation
for the (i, j)-th element of Π0. The concise model is then,
yi = xpi
0
i + vi (17)
for each i = 1, . . . , N , where also vi = [vi1, . . . , viT ]
′. Model (17) can then be estimated equation-
by-equation. Denote pi0 = [pi01
′
, . . . , pi0N
′
]′. Stacking the full set of N equations,
y = Xpi0 + v (18)
37We set Caner and Zhang’s (2014) suggestion for the initial condition as one of those particles, with minor
modifications. The authors suggest calculating the absolute value of the derivative of the unpenalized GMM
objective function evaluated at zero, ∇W , and the set parameters smaller than p1 at zero. The rationale is that
if the GMM objective function is invariant with respect to certain parameters, the Elastic Net problem achieves a
corner solution (where parameters are set to zero). In our case, allowing only for positive interactions, we set to zero
the elements such that −∇W ≤ p1. All other elements of W gain equal weights such that row-sum normalization is
respected. The derivative ∇W is mechanically zero if ρ = γ = 0. So we set ρ = .5, given that the parameter space
is bounded and ρ ∈ [0, 1). The other parameters that enter the derivative are βˆ estimated from a regression of y on
x, with the full set of fixed effects, and γ = 0.
38We also implemented an additional five particles. Particle 2: like Particle 1 but with size proportional to the
magnitude of the derivatives conditional on −∇W being greater than p1; Particle 3: sets to non-zero all positive
elements of −∇W with equal weights; Particle 4: selects 5% highest values of −∇W , sets all others to zero, and non-
zero gain equal weights; Particle 5: W obtained from the Lasso regression of yt on the yt of others with penalization
p1; Particle 6: W obtained from the Lasso regression of yt on the xt of others with penalization p1. In all cases,
weights are rescaled by row-specific constants such that row-sum normalization is complied with. The remaining
94 particles are uniformly randomly selected by the built-in MATLAB particle swarm algorithm.
39At each row, we pick the j∗ closest to the main diagonal of W .
40Note that the Elastic Net penalty p1
∑ |Wi,j | is invariant with respect to choices ofW if row-sum normalization
is imposed. Yet, the penalty affects the initial selection of arguments in which Wi,j is restricted to zero if the
derivative of the objective function is smaller than p1 in absolute value.
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where y = [y1, . . . , yN ], X = IN ⊗ x, pi0 = vec (Π′0), and v = [v1, . . . , vN ]. If the number of individ-
uals in the network N is fixed and much smaller than data points available, N2  NT , equation
(18) can be estimated via ordinary least squares (OLS). Under suitable regularity conditions, the
OLS estimator pˆi = (X ′X)−1X ′y is asymptotically distributed,
√
NT (pˆi − pi0) d−→ N (0, Q−1ΣQ−1)
where QT ≡ 1NTX ′X, Q ≡ p limT→∞QT , ΣT ≡ 1NTX ′vv′X and Σ ≡ p limT→∞ΣT . The proof is
standard and omitted here. As noted above, in typical applications it is customary to row-sum
normalize matrix W . If no individual is isolated, one obtains that, by equation (5),
Π0ιN = β0ι+ (ρ0β0 + γ0)
∞∑
k=1
ρk−10 W
k
0 ι
=
β0 + γ0
1− ρ0
ι (19)
where ιN is the N -length vector of ones. The last equality follows from the observation that, under
row-normalization of W0, W kι = Wι = ι, k > 0. Equation (19) implies that Π0 has constant
row-sums, which implies that row-sum normalization is, in principle, testable. This suggests a
simple Wald statistic applied to the estimates of pi0. Under the null hypothesis,
√
NTRpˆi
d−→ N (0, RQ−1ΣQ−1R′)
where R = [IN−1 ⊗ ι′N ;−ιN−1 ⊗ ι′N ]. The Wald statistic is W = NT (Rpˆi)′ (Q−1ΣQ−1)−1 (Rpˆi) ∼
χ2N−1 which is a convenient expression for testing row-sum normalization of W0. We also note that
the asymptotic distribution of θˆ can be immediately obtained by the Delta Method,
√
T (θˆ − θ0) d−→ N
(
0,∇′−1θ Q−1ΣQ−1∇θ
)
where ∇θ is the gradient of θˆ with respect to pˆi. We note that the derivation of the Wald statistic
for testing the row-sum normalization and the asymptotic distribution of θˆ does not depend on
the OLS implementation, and can be easily adjusted for any estimator for which the asymptotic
distribution is known.
C Simulations
C.1 Set-Up
The simulations are based on two stylized random network structures, and two real world networks.
These networks vary in their size, complexity, and aggregate and node-level features. All four
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networks are also sparse. The two stylized networks considered are:
(i) Erdos-Renyi network: we randomly pick exactly one element in each row of W0 and set that
element to 1. This is a random graph with in-degree equal to 1 for every individual (Erdos
and Renyi, 1960). Such a network could be observed in practice if connections are formed
independently of one another. With N = 30, the resulting density of links is 3.45%.
(ii) Political party network: there are two parties, each with a party leader. The leader directly
affects the behavior of half the party members. We assume that one party has twice the
number of members as the other. More specifically, we assume individuals i = 1, . . . , N
3
are
affiliated to Party A and are led by individual 1; individuals i = N
3
+ 1, . . . , N are affiliated
to Party B and are led by individual N
3
+1. This difference in party size allows us to evaluate
our ability to recover and identify central leaders, even in the smaller party. To test the
procedure further, we add one random link per row to represent ties that are not determined
by links to the Party leader. We simulate this network for various choices of N . If N is not
a multiple of three, we round N
3
to the nearest integer. With N = 30, this network has a
density of 5.17%.
(iii) Coleman’s (1964) high school friendship network survey: in 1957/8, students in a small high
school in Illinois were asked to name, “fellows that they go around with most often.” A link
was considered if the student nominated a peer in either survey wave. The full network has
N = 73 nodes, of which 70 are non-isolated and so have at least one link to another student.
On average, students named just over five friendship peers. This network has density 7.58%.
Furthermore, the in-degree distribution shows that most individuals received a small number
of links, while a small number received many peer nominations.
(iv) Banerjee et al.’s (2013) village network survey: these authors conducted a census of house-
holds in 75 villages in rural Karnataka, India, and survey questions include several about
relationships with other households in the village. To begin with, we use social ties based
on family relations (later examining insurance networks). We focus on village 10 that is
comprised of N = 77 households, and so similar in size to network (iii). In this village there
are 65 non-isolated households, with at least one family link to another household. This
network has density 5.07%.
For the stylized networks (i) and (ii), we first assess the performance of the estimator for a
fixed network size, N = 30. We later show how performance varies with alternative network sizes.
We simulate the real-world networks (iii) and (iv) using non-isolated nodes in each (so N = 70
and 65 respectively). As in Bramoullé et al., 2009, we exclude isolated nodes because they do not
conform with row-sum normalization.
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Our result identifies entries in W0 and so naturally recovers links of varying strength. Data
limitations often force researchers to postulate some ties to be weaker than others (say, based on
interaction frequency). This is in sharp contrast to our approach, that identifies the continuous
strength of ties, W0,ij, where W0,ij > 0 implies node j influences node i.
To establish the performance of the estimator in capturing variation in link strength, we proceed
as follows for each network. First, for each node we randomly assign one of their links to have
value W0,ij = .7. As the underlying data generating process is assumed to allow for common time
effects (αt), we then set the weight on all other links from the node to be equal and such that
row-sum normalization (A4’) is complied with.41 As we consider larger networks, we typically
expect them to have more non-zero entries in each row of W0, but row-sum normalization means
that each weaker link will be of lower value. This works against the detection of weaker links
using estimation methods involving penalization, because they impose small parameter estimates
shrink to zero.42 Finally, to aid exposition, we set a threshold value for link strength to distinguish
‘strong’ and ‘weak’ links. A strong (weak) link is defined as one for which W0,ij > (≤) .3.
Summary statistics for each network are presented in Panel A of Table A1. Following Jackson
et al. (2017), we consider the following network-wide statistics: number of edges, number of strong
and weak edges, number of reciprocated edges, clustering coefficient, number of components, and
the size of the maximal component. In addition, we report the standard deviation calculated
across elements of the diagonal of W 20 . If this is zero, then the diagonal of W 20 is either zero or
proportional to the vector of ones, and Assumption A5 would not be satisfied. We can see that
for each case this statistic is well above zero.
Following Jackson et al. (2017), we consider the following node-level statistics: in- and out-
degree distribution (mean and standard deviation), and the three most central individuals. The
four networks differ in their size, complexity, and the relative importance of strong and weak ties.
For example, the Erdos-Renyi network only has strong ties, the political party network has twice
as many strong as weak ties. For the real world networks, the mean out-degree distributions are
higher so the majority of ties are weak, with the high school network having around 80% of its
edges being weak ties.
Panel data for each of the four simulations is generated as,
yt = (I − ρ0W0)−1(xtβ +W0xtγ + αtι+ α∗ + t),
where αt is a (scalar) time effect and α∗ is a N × 1 vector of fixed effects, drawn respectively from
41For example, if in a given row of W0 there are two links, one will be randomly selected to be set to .7, and the
other set to .3. If there are three links one is set to .7 and the other two set to each have weight .15 to maintain
row-sum normalization, and so on. For the Erdos-Renyi network, there are thus only strong ties as each node has
only one link to another node.
42Caner and Zhang (2014) state that “local to zero coefficients should be larger than T−
1
2 to be differentiated
from zero.”
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N(1, 1) and N(ι, IN×N) distributions. We consider T = {5, 10, 15, 25, 50, 75, 100, 125, 150}. The
true parameters are set to ρ0 = .3, β0 = .4 and γ0 = .5 (thus satisfying Assumption A3). The
exogenous variable (xt) and error term (t) are simulated as standard Gaussian, both generated
from N(0N , IN×N) distributions. This is similar to variance terms set in other papers, e.g., Lee
(2004). We later conduct a series of robustness checks to evaluate the sensitivity of the simulations
to alternative parameters choices, and the presence of common- and individual-level shocks.
For each combination of parameters, we conduct 1, 000 simulation runs. On the initial 50
runs, we choose penalization parameters p that minimize the BIC criteria on a grid. This is
computationally intensive because it requires running the optimization procedure described in
Section 3.1 as many times as the number of points in the grid for p.43 To reduce the computational
burden, we do so only in the initial 50 runs and consider these simulation runs as a calibration
of p. For the remaining 950 iterations, the penalization parameter p is set fixed at the median p
computed over the calibration runs. This only worsens the performance of the estimator, since a
sub-optimal p is chosen for the majority of the iterations.
C.2 Results
We evaluate the procedure over varying panel lengths (starting from short panels with T = 5),
using the following metrics. Given our core contribution is to identify the social interactions matrix,
we first examine the proportion of true zero entries in W0 estimated as zeros, and the proportion
of true non-zero entries estimated as non-zeros. A global perspective of the proximity between
the true and estimated network can be inferred from their average absolute distance between
elements. This is the mean absolute deviation of Wˆ and Πˆ relative to their true values, defined
as MAD(Wˆ ) = 1
N(N−1)
∑
i,j,i6=j |Wˆij − Wij,0| and MAD(Πˆ) = 1N(N−1)
∑
i,j,i6=j |Πˆij − Πij,0|. The
closer these metrics are to zero, more of the elements in the true matrix are correctly estimated.
Finally, we evaluate the performance of the procedure using averaged estimates of the endogenous
and exogenous social effect parameters, ρˆ and γˆ. In keeping with the estimation strategy in our
empirical application, we report ‘post-Elastic Net’ estimates obtained after having estimated the
social interactions matrix by the Elastic Net GMM procedure. We use peers-of-peers’ covariates
from the estimated matrix as instrumental variables.
Each Panel in Figure A1 shows a different metric as we vary T for each simulated network.
Panel A shows that for each network, the proportion of zero entries in W0 correctly estimated as
zeros is above 90% even when exploiting a small number of time periods (T = 5). The proportion
approaches 100% as T grows. Panel B shows the proportion of non-zeros entries estimated as
non-zeros is also high for small T . It is above 70% from T = 5 for the Erdos-Renyi network, being
at least 85% across networks for T = 25, and increasing as T grows.
43In our simulations, we set the penalization grid to p1 = [0, .025, .05, .10], p∗1 = [0, .025, .05, .10] and p2 =
[0, .025, .05, .10], resulting in 43 = 64 points per run.
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Panels C and D show that for each simulated network, the mean absolute deviation between
estimated and true networks for Wˆ and Πˆ falls quickly with T and is close zero for large sample
sizes. Finally, Panels E and F show that biases in the endogenous and exogenous social effects
parameters, ρˆ and γˆ, also fall quickly in T (we do not report the bias in βˆ since it is close to
zero for all T ). The fact that biases are not zero is as expected for small T , being analogous to
well-known results for autoregressive time series models.
Figure A2 provides a visual representation of the simulated and actual networks under T = 100
time periods. The network size is set to N = 30 in the two stylized networks, N = 70 for the high
school network, and N = 65 for the village household network. In comparing the simulated and
true network, Figure A2 distinguishes between three types of edges: kept edges, added edges and
removed edges. Kept edges are depicted in blue: these links are estimated as non-zero in at least
5% of the iterations and are also non-zero in the true network. Added edges are depicted in green:
these links are estimated as non-zero in at least 5% of the iterations but the edge is zero in the
true network. Removed edges are depicted in red: these links are estimated as zero in at least 5%
of the iterations but are non-zero in the true network. Figure A2 further distinguishes between
strong and weak links: strong links are shown in solid edges (W0,ij > .3), and weak links are shown
as dashed edges.
Consider first Panel A of Figure A2, comparing the simulated and true Erdos-Renyi network.
All zero and all non-zero links are correctly estimated. All links are thus recovered and no edges are
added to the true network (all edges are in blue). For the political party network, Panel B shows
that all strong edges are correctly estimated (it also highlights the party leader nodes). However,
around half the weak edges are recovered (blue dashed edges) with the others being missed (red
dashed edges). As discussed above, this is not surprising given that shrinkage estimators force
small non-zero parameters to zero. Hence, larger T is needed to achieve similar performance as
in the other simulated networks in terms of detecting weak links. Again, we never estimate any
added edges (no edges are green).
For the more complex and larger real-world networks, Panel C shows that in the high school
network, strong edges are all recovered. However, around half the weak edges are missing (red
dashed edges) and there are a relatively small number of added edges (green edges): these amount
to 87 edges, or approximately 1.9% of the 4, 534 zero entries in the true high-school network. A
similar pattern of results is seen in the village network in Panel D: strong edges are all recovered,
and here the majority of weak edges are also recovered. A relatively small share of overall edges
are added or missed.
Panel B of Table A1 compares the network- and node-level statistics calculated from the recov-
ered social interactions matrix Wˆ to those in Panel A from the true interactions matrix W0. As
Figure A2 showed, the random Erdos-Renyi network is perfectly recovered. For the political party
network, the number of recovered edges is slightly lower than the true network (38 vs. 45). This
is driven by weak edges: while all the strong edges are recovered (30 out of 30), not all the weak
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ones are (8 vs. 15). On node-level statistics, the mean of the in- and out-degree distributions are
slightly lower in the recovered network, the clustering coefficient is exactly recovered, and all three
nodes with the highest out-degree are correctly captured (nodes 1, 11 and 28), that includes both
party leaders (individuals 1 and 11).
Performance in the two real world networks is also encouraging. In the high school network,
all strong edges are correctly recovered, as are the majority of weak edges. However, as already
noted in Figure A2, because weak edges are not well estimated in the high school network, the
average in- and out- degrees are smaller in the recovered network relative to the true network. We
recover two out of the three individuals with the highest out-degree (nodes 21 and 69). Finally,
in the village network, all strong edges are recovered, the majority of weak edges are recovered,
the clustering coefficients are similar across recovered and true networks (.134 vs. .141) and we
recover two out of the three households with the highest out-degree (nodes 16, 35, and 57).
C.3 Robustness
Table A2 presents results for the recovered stylized networks under varying network sizes, N =
{15, 30, 50}. Differences between the true and estimated networks are fairly constant as N in-
creases: even for small N = 15 a large proportion of zeros and non-zeros are correctly estimated.
In all cases, biases in ρˆ and γˆ decrease with larger T . We also conduct a counterpart robustness
check for one of the real work networks. More precisely, we use the savings and insurance networks
between households in villages identified in Banerjee et al. (2013), that are generally larger than
family networks focused on so far. Table A3 shows descriptive statistics on this true village net-
work (Panel A) and the recovered network (Panel B). Relative to the family network, the savings
and insurance network has many more edges, a greater proportion of weak edges, is less clustered,
with nodes having a higher degree distribution. Despite these differences, the recovered network
retains good accuracy on many dimensions: 78% of all edges are recovered, the recovered clustering
coefficient is .058 (relative to an actual coefficient of .073) and the three nodes with the highest
out-degree are all still identified.
Table A4 conducts robustness checks on the sensitivity of the estimates to parameters choices.
We consider true parameters ρ0 = {.1, .3, .7, .9}, γ0 = {.3, .7}, β0 = {.0, .8}. We also introduce a
common shock in the disturbance variance-covariance matrix by varying q in,
t ∼ N
0,

1 q · · · q
q 1 · · · q
...
... . . .
...
q q · · · 1


where we consider q = {.3, .5, .8, 1}. We find the procedure to be robust to the true values of
ρ0, β0, γ0, and q. For β0 = 0, performance is slightly worse. This is expected as the exogenous
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variation from xt no longer affects yt directly.
We next probe the procedure by richening up the structure of shocks across nodes. First, we
introduce a common shock correlated with covariates xt. To do so, we take xt from a Gaussian
distribution with mean 0.5αtι and, as before, variance 1. Second, we implement a version where
the shock is constant over time but varies at the individual level. In this case, the mean of xt is
given by 0.5α∗. Third, we implement a version mixing the two types of shocks, with the mean of
xt given by 0.5α∗+0.5αtι. In each case, we simulate based on the Erdos-Renyi network as the true
W0. The results are shown in Figure A3: this shows that for each of the six performance metrics
considered, the procedure is highly robust to these richer structures of shocks across individuals
and time periods.
The final robustness check demonstrates the gains from using the Adaptive Elastic Net GMM
estimator over alternative estimators. Table A5 shows simulation results using Adaptive Lasso
estimates of the interaction matrix Π0, so estimating and penalizing the reduced-form. The Adap-
tive Lasso estimator performs relatively worse: the mean absolute deviation between Wˆ and W0 is
often two to three times larger than the corresponding Adaptive Elastic Net estimates. Appendix
Table A6 then shows the performance of the procedure based on OLS estimates of Π0. Given OLS
requires m NT , we use a time dimension ten times larger, T = {500, 1000, 1500}, and still find
a deterioration in performance compared to the Adaptive Elastic Net GMM estimator.
Taken together, these robustness checks suggest the Adaptive Elastic Net GMM estimator is
preferred over Adaptive Lasso and OLS estimators. This procedure does well in recovering true
network structures, and a fortiori, network- and node-level statistics. It does so in networks that
vary in size and complexity, and as the underlying social interactions model varies in the strength
of endogenous and exogenous social effects, and the structure of shocks.
D Application: Counterfactuals
We consider a scenario in which California exogenously increases the change in its taxes per capita,
so ∆τ it corresponds to an increase of 10%. We measure the differential change in equilibrium state
taxes in state j under the two network structures using the following statistic:
Υj = log(∆τ jt|Wˆecon)− log(∆τ jt|Wgeo), (20)
so that positive (negative) values imply taxes being higher (or lower) under Wˆecon than Wgeo.44
Figure A4 graphs Υj for each mainland US state (including for California itself, the origin of
the shock). A wide discrepancy between the equilibrium state tax rates predicted under Wˆecon
relative to Wgeo: across states Υj varies from −3.03 to 9.61. Only in one state is Υj close to
44We calculate the counterfactual at ρˆ2SLS = .608, the endogenous effect parameter estimated in our preferred
specification, Column 7 of Table 2.
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zero. Table A9 summarizes the general equilibrium effects under both structures. We see that
average tax rate increases are 74% higher under Wˆecon. The dispersion of tax rates across states
also increases dramatically under Wˆecon. Finally, assuming interactions across states are based
solely on geographic neighbors, we miss the fact that many states will have relatively small tax
increases.
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Figure 1B: Network Graph of US States, Identified Economic Neighbors
Notes: Figure 3B represents the continental United States (N=48). The economic network is derived from our preferred specification, where we penalize geographic neighbors to states, and
allow for exogenous social effects. A blue edge is drawn between a pair of states if they are geographic neighbors and were estimated as connected. A red edge is drawn between a pair of states
if they are geographic neighbors but were not estimated as connected. A green edge is drawn between a pair of states if they are not geographic neighbors and were estimated connected. The
left hand side graph just shows read and blue edges. The right hand side shows all three types of edges. State abbreviations are as used by US Post Office (http://about.usps.com/who-we-
are/postal-history/state-abbreviations.pdf).
Notes: Figure 3A represents the continental US states (N=48). An edge is drawn between a pair of states if they share a geographic border. State abbreviations are as used by US Post Office
(http://about.usps.com/who-we-are/postal-history/state-abbreviations.pdf).
Figure 1A: Network Graph of US States, Geographic Neighbors
Geographic network edges
Removed (geographic) edges in economic network
New edges added in economic networks
Panel B: In-network for California
Figure 2: Strength of Ties and Reciprocity
Panel C: Out-network for California
Panel A: Histogram of Strength of Ties, Conditional on W0,ij>0
Notes: Panel A is the histogram of ties in the economic network, conditional on non-zero ties. Panels B and C show the in-network and out-network of California as derived
from our preferred specification, where we penalize geographic neighbors to states, and allow for exogenous social effects. The in-network are the states that determine tax
setting in California. The out-network is the states in which taxes are set in direct response to those in California. A blue edge is drawn between a pair of states if they are
geographic neighbors and were estimated as connected. A red edge is drawn between a pair of states if they are geographic neighbors but were not estimated as connected.
A green edge is drawn between a pair of states if they are not geographic neighbors and were estimated connected. State abbreviations are as used by US Post Office
(http://about.usps.com/who-we-are/postal-history/state-abbreviations.pdf).
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A. % of zeros B. % of non-zeros
C. Mean Absolute Deviation of D. Mean Absolute Deviation of
E. Endogenous Social Effect, F. Exogenous Social Effect
Notes: These simulation results are based on the Banerjee et al. (2013) village network, using the Adaptive Elastic Net GMM
algorithm, with penalization parameters chosen by BIC, under various assumptions about knowledge of the true network and
time periods T=25, 50, 100, 125 and 150. The “Village" case refers to the simulation implemented without knowledge about the
true network. "Village (top 3)" refers to the case where all connections of the three households with highest out-degrees are
assumed to be known. "Village (top 5)" and "Village (top 103)" are analogously defined. In all cases, 1000 Monte Carlo
iterations were performed. The true parameters are rho-0=.3, beta-0=.4 and gamma-0=.5. In Panel A, the % of zeroes refers to
the proportion of true zero elements in the social interaction matrix that are estimated as smaller than .05. In Panel B, the % of
non-zeros refers to the proportion of true elements greater than .3 in the social interaction matrix that are estimated as non-
zeros. In Panels C and D, the Mean Absolute Deviations are the mean absolute error of the estimated network compared to the
true network for the social interaction matrix W and the reduced form matrix respectively. In Panels E and F, the true parameter
values are marked in the horizontal red lines. The recovered parameter are the estimated parameters averaged across
iterations. All specifications include time and node fixed effects.
Figure 4: Simulation Results, Adaptive Elastic Net GMM
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Panel B: Econ Network, 1989-2015 subsample
Panel C: Geographic Versus Economic Neighbor Networks
Geographic
Neighbor
Network
Economic Neighbor
Network (Full Sample)
Economic Neighbor
Network (1962-1988)
Economic Neighbor
Network (1989-2015)
Number of Edges 214 144 197 185
Edges in both W-geo and W-econ 79 108 86
Edges in W-econ only 65 89 99
Edges in W-geo only 135 106 128
Clustering .1936 .0259 .0389 .0394
Reciprocated Edges 100% 29.17% 35.53% 23.78%
out-degree 3.000 (1.185) 4.104 (1.704) 3.854 (1.473)
in-degree 3.000 (2.073) 4.104 (2.707) 3.854 (2.518)
Notes: This compares statistics derived from the geographic network of US states to those from the estimated economic network among US states, for the three samples ("Full Sample", 1962-
2015; 1962-1988; 1989-2015). The number of edges, edges in both networks, edges in W-geo only, edges in W-econ only counts the number of edges in those categories. Numbers are relative
to the W-geo network in the first column. Reciprocated edges is the frequency of in-edges that are reciprocated by out-edges (by construction, this is 100% for geographic networks). The
clustering coefficient is the frequency of the number of fully connected triplets over the total number of triplets. The degree distribution across nodes counts the average number of connections
(standard deviation in parentheses): we show this separately for in-degree and out-degree (by construction, these are identical for geographic networks).
Panel A: Econ Network, 1962-1988 subsample
Figure 5: Network Graph of US States, Identified Economic Neighbors by Subsamples
Notes: Panels A and B represents the continental United States (N=48). Panel A is estimated withe 1962-1988 subsample. Panel B is estimated with the 1989-2015 subsample. The economic
network is derived from our preferred specification, where we penalize geographic neighbors to states, and allow for exogenous social effects. A blue edge is drawn between a pair of states if they
are geographic neighbors and were estimated as connected. A red edge is drawn between a pair of states if they are geographic neighbors but were not estimated as connected. A green edge is
drawn between a pair of states if they are not geographic neighbors and were estimated connected. The left hand side graph just shows read and blue edges. The right hand side shows all three
types of edges. State abbreviations are as used by US Post Office (http://about.usps.com/who-we-are/postal-history/state-abbreviations.pdf).
Degree Distribution Across Nodes (states)
4.458 (1.597)
Erdos-Renyi Political Party High school Village
Coleman (1964) Banerjee et al. (2013)
Number of nodes 30 30 70 65
(a) Network-wide statistics
Number of edges 30 45 366 240
Number of strong edges 30 30 70 65
Number of weak edges 0 15 296 175
Number of reciprocated edges 2 2 184 240
Clustering coefficient - .000 .120 .141
Number of components 12 11 3 3
Size of maximal component 10 16 68 51
Standard deviation of the
diagonal of squared W
(b) Node-level statistics
In-degree distribution 1.00 (0.00) 1.50 (.509) 5.23 (2.04) 3.69 (2.35)
Out-degree distribution 1.00 (1.05) 1.50 (2.49) 5.23 (3.64) 3.69 (2.35)
Nodes with highest out-degree { 7, 11, 26 } { 1, 11 , 28 } { 21, 22, 69 } { 16, 35, 57 }
(a) Network-wide statistics
Number of edges 30 38 210 194
Number of strong edges 30 30 70 68
Number of weak edges 0 8 140 126
Number of reciprocated edges 2 2 184 170
Clustering coefficient - .000 .162 .134
Number of components 12 11 1 4
Size of maximal component 10 14 70 48
(b) Node-level statistics
In-degree distribution 1.00 (0.00) 1.27 (.450) 3.00 (1.18) 2.99 (1.29)
Out-degree distribution 1.00 (1.05) 1.27 (1.76) 3.00 (1.02) 2.99 (1.15)
Nodes with highest out-degree { 7, 11, 26 } { 1, 11, 28 } { 21, 48, 69 } { 16, 35, 57 }
A. True Networks
Table A1: True and Recovered Networks
Notes: Panel A refers to the true networks. Panel B refers to the recovered networks. In each Panel, the summary statistics are divided into
network-wide and node-level statistics. Strong edges are defined as those with strength greater than or equal to .3. For the in-degree and out-
degree distribution, the mean is shown and the standard deviation is in parentheses. The nodes with the highest out-degree are those with the
greatest influence on others, and are calculated as the column-sum of the social interaction matrix. The recovered networks statistic are calculated
over the average network across simulations with T=100.
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B. Recovered Networks
Table
A2:Sim
ulation
Results,Adaptive
Elastic
NetGM
M
,Alternative
Network
Sizes
T=50
100
150
T=50
100
150
T=50
100
150
T=50
100
150
T=50
100
150
T=50
100
150
%
True
Zeroes
.954
.976
.973
.957
.992
.997
.947
.965
.979
.950
.977
.979
.943
.978
.989
.943
.961
.976
(.033)
(.031)
(.031)
(.009)
(.004)
(.002)
(.007)
(.006)
(.005)
(.031)
(.025)
(.024)
(.009)
(.006)
(.005)
(.007)
(.006)
(.006)
%
True
Non-Zeroes
.899
.919
.924
.958
.960
.962
.977
.978
.977
.914
.925
.932
.930
.954
.960
.970
.977
.977
(.051)
(.032)
(.026)
(.017)
(.016)
(.011)
(.007)
(.007)
(.008)
(.038)
(.022)
(.009)
(.037)
(.023)
(.016)
(.015)
(.009)
(.007)
.021
.007
.004
.017
.003
.001
.020
.011
.006
.032
.019
.017
.028
.014
.010
.023
.014
.009
(.014)
(.011)
(.008)
(.004)
(.001)
(.001)
(.002)
(.001)
(.001)
(.011)
(.007)
(.004)
(.004)
(.002)
(.002)
(.002)
(.001)
(.001)
.025
.012
.009
.020
.004
.003
.054
.016
.007
.034
.021
.019
.028
.014
.012
.065
.019
.009
(.012)
(.008)
(.006)
(.004)
(.002)
(.001)
(.018)
(.004)
(.002)
(.009)
(.006)
(.003)
(.004)
(.002)
(.001)
(.028)
(.004)
(.001)
.262
.270
.276
.286
.286
.283
.667
.398
.270
.235
.245
.241
.209
.228
.223
.700
.383
.242
(.069)
(.044)
(.038)
(.079)
(.026)
(.022)
(.079)
(.050)
(.050)
(.078)
(.049)
(.038)
(.084)
(.035)
(.029)
(.100)
(.069)
(.051)
.403
.399
.400
.405
.400
.400
.380
.399
.401
.405
.400
.397
.404
.399
.398
.380
.400
.401
(.039)
(.028)
(.022)
(.028)
(.018)
(.015)
(.025)
(.015)
(.012)
(.040)
(.028)
(.022)
(.029)
(.019)
(.015)
(.024)
(.015)
(.012)
.577
.521
.507
.670
.516
.498
.748
.686
.595
.550
.481
.459
.669
.501
.463
.686
.666
.566
(.094)
(.059)
(.046)
(.054)
(.022)
(.018)
(.118)
(.056)
(.028)
(.093)
(.060)
(.050)
(.060)
(.027)
(.021)
(.128)
(.063)
(.032)
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Table A3: True and Recovered Village Networks
Village Village
Family Savings and Insurance
Banerjee et al. (2013) Banerjee et al. (2013)
Number of nodes 65 65
(a) Network-wide statistics
Number of edges 240 343
Number of strong edges 65 47
Number of weak edges 175 296
Number of reciprocated edges 240 340
Clustering coefficient .141 .073
Number of components 3 6
Size of maximal component 51 62
Standard deviation of the
diagonal of squared W
(b) Node-level statistics
In-degree distribution 3.69 (2.35) 4.90 (3.42)
Out-degree distribution 3.69 (2.35) 4.90 (3.43)
Nodes with highest out-degree { 16, 35, 57 } { 16, 35, 55 }
(a) Network-wide statistics
Number of edges 194 269
Number of strong edges 68 65
Number of weak edges 126 204
Number of reciprocated edges 170 250
Clustering coefficient .134 .058
Number of components 4 4
Size of maximal component 48 62
(b) Node-level statistics
In-degree distribution 2.99 (1.29) 3.84 (1.90)
Out-degree distribution 2.99 (1.15) 3.84 (1.98)
Nodes with highest out-degree { 16, 35, 57 } { 16, 35, 55 }
.159
Notes: Panel A refers to the true networks. Panel B refers to the recovered networks. In each Panel, the
summary statistics are divided into network-wide and node-level statistics. Strong edges are defined as those
with strength greater than or equal to .3. For the in-degree and out-degree distribution, the mean is shown and
the standard deviation is in parentheses. The nodes with the highest out-degree are those with the greatest
influence on others, and are calculated as the column-sum of the social interaction matrix. The recovered
networks statistic are calculated over the average network across simulations with T=100.
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A. True Networks
B. Recovered Networks
Table
A4:Sim
ulation
Results,Adaptive
Elastic
NetGM
M
,Alternative
Param
eters
.1
.5
.7
.9
.0
.8
.3
.7
.3
.5
.8
1.0
.1
.5
.7
.9
.0
.8
.3
.7
.3
.5
.8
1.0
%
True
Zeroes
.986
.994
.991
.979
.986
.987
.974
.997
.996
.997
.997
.997
.971
.983
.982
.966
.978
.977
.959
.986
.985
.992
.996
.997
(.005)
(.004)
(.004)
(.005)
(.005)
(.007)
(.006)
(.002)
(.002)
(.003)
(.002)
(.002)
(.008)
(.005)
(.006)
(.007)
(.008)
(.007)
(.007)
(.005)
(.004)
(.004)
(.004)
(.003)
%
True
Non-Zeroes
.951
.963
.963
.956
.806
.967
.961
.961
.963
.962
.961
.959
.772
.813
.836
.864
.469
.856
.741
.834
.803
.808
.816
.832
(.028)
(.011)
(.011)
(.017)
(.096)
.000
(.015)
(.016)
(.012)
(.013)
(.013)
(.018)
(.045)
(.036)
(.034)
(.031)
(.147)
(.035)
(.044)
(.036)
(.037)
(.035)
(.034)
(.027)
.005
.002
.003
.007
.014
.004
.011
.001
.001
.001
.000
.000
.017
.012
.012
.018
.029
.012
.023
.010
.011
.009
.008
.007
(.002)
(.001)
(.001)
(.002)
(.005)
(.002)
(.003)
(.001)
(.001)
(.001)
(.001)
(.001)
(.003)
(.002)
(.002)
(.003)
(.007)
(.002)
(.003)
(.002)
(.002)
(.001)
(.001)
(.001)
.005
.006
.013
.077
.013
.007
.009
.004
.003
.003
.002
.002
.011
.021
.043
.208
.021
.017
.016
.016
.013
.011
.010
.009
(.002)
(.002)
(.005)
(.051)
(.004)
(.003)
(.002)
(.002)
(.001)
(.001)
(.001)
(.001)
(.002)
(.002)
(.004)
(.026)
(.004)
(.003)
(.002)
(.002)
(.002)
(.001)
(.001)
(.001)
.081
.487
.709
.917
.318
.244
.287
.286
.285
.285
.288
.292
.046
.403
.598
.847
.298
.171
.221
.225
.224
.222
.218
.218
(.034)
(.027)
(.025)
(.012)
(.047)
(.076)
(.036)
(.023)
(.023)
(.020)
(.017)
(.009)
(.038)
(.031)
(.040)
(.040)
(.071)
(.067)
(.048)
(.030)
(.030)
(.028)
(.025)
(.018)
.401
.399
.397
.364
(.008)
.801
.402
.399
.401
.400
.400
.400
.400
.399
.398
.380
-.015
.801
.402
.400
.399
.398
.398
.398
(.018)
(.019)
(.019)
(.023)
(.025)
(.018)
(.019)
(.019)
(.016)
(.012)
(.009)
(.001)
(.019)
(.020)
(.020)
(.026)
(.029)
(.020)
(.020)
(.019)
(.016)
(.014)
(.009)
(.003)
.532
.512
.517
.509
.432
.552
.376
.698
.503
.495
.493
.492
.519
.489
.488
.469
.305
.548
.391
.638
.474
.454
.440
.431
(.023)
(.022)
(.024)
(.028)
(.070)
(.033)
(.027)
(.021)
(.018)
(.015)
(.012)
(.007)
(.030)
(.027)
(.031)
(.050)
(.117)
(.038)
(.036)
(.025)
(.023)
(.019)
(.015)
(.010)
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sim
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pared
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forthe
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form
m
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respectively.The
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param
eter
are
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across
iterations.A
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include
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e
and
node
fixed
effects.S
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errors
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iterations
are
in
parentheses.
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T=50
100
150
T=50
100
150
T=50
100
150
T=50
100
150
T=50
100
150
T=50
100
150
%
True
Zeroes
.728
.798
.842
.737
.848
.878
.845
.846
.913
.730
.799
.840
.737
.849
.880
.846
.846
.921
(.023)
(.024)
(.022)
(.012)
(.008)
(.008)
(.005)
(.006)
(.027)
(.024)
(.025)
(.023)
(.013)
(.009)
(.009)
(.006)
(.006)
(.008)
%
True
Non-Zeroes
.996
1.000
1.000
.497
1.000
1.000
.494
.496
.930
.992
1.000
1.000
.507
1.000
1.000
.498
.501
.996
(.039)
(.000)
(.000)
(.096)
(.001)
(.000)
(.071)
(.074)
(.177)
(.023)
(.002)
(.000)
(.105)
(.004)
(.001)
(.074)
(.076)
(.042)
.071
.050
.039
.064
.039
.033
.039
.039
.027
.070
.050
.039
.063
.038
.032
.039
.038
.025
(.005)
(.005)
(.004)
(.002)
(.002)
(.002)
(.000)
(.002)
(.005)
(.005)
(.004)
(.004)
(.002)
(.002)
(.002)
(.000)
(.002)
(.001)
.092
.056
.042
.084
.049
.036
.071
.045
.032
.093
.057
.044
.084
.050
.036
.071
.045
.033
(.008)
(.005)
(.004)
(.005)
(.003)
(.002)
(.004)
(.003)
(.002)
(.008)
(.005)
(.003)
(.005)
(.003)
(.002)
(.004)
(.002)
(.002)
.962
.815
.535
.998
.988
.965
1.000
.993
.995
.970
.783
.512
.998
.993
.979
1.000
.994
.995
(.112)
(.186)
(.231)
(.040)
(.066)
(.095)
(.000)
(.075)
(.054)
(.106)
(.199)
(.236)
(.041)
(.050)
(.077)
(.000)
(.069)
(.054)
.131
.285
.330
.000
.158
.254
.000
.000
.121
.144
.292
.336
.000
.177
.259
.000
.000
.167
(.079)
(.049)
(.038)
(.000)
(.053)
(.030)
(.000)
(.000)
(.066)
(.081)
(.049)
(.039)
(.000)
(.047)
(.030)
(.000)
(.000)
(.044)
.996
.998
.968
.000
1.000
.999
.000
.000
.863
1.000
.995
.942
.000
1.000
.999
.000
.000
.992
(.063)
(.015)
(.051)
(.000)
(.000)
(.007)
(.000)
(.000)
(.344)
(.000)
(.023)
(.066)
(.000)
(.000)
(.014)
(.000)
(.000)
(.089)
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T=500
1000
1500
T=500
1000
1500
T=500
1000
1500
T=500
1000
1500
T=500
1000
1500
T=500
1000
1500
%
True
Zeroes
.825
.878
.911
.884
.928
.958
.936
.966
.979
.824
.882
.916
.886
.932
.959
.940
.967
.979
(.018)
(.020)
(.021)
(.007)
(.007)
(.006)
(.019)
(.003)
(.002)
(.020)
(.021)
(.020)
(.007)
(.007)
(.005)
(.003)
(.003)
(.002)
%
True
Non-Zeroes
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
.977
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
(.000)
(.000)
(.000)
(.000)
(.000)
(.000)
(.107)
(.000)
(.000)
(.000)
(.000)
(.000)
(.000)
(.000)
(.000)
(.000)
(.000)
(.000)
.039
.032
.028
.031
.025
.022
.025
.021
.019
.037
.030
.025
.030
.024
.021
.024
.020
.018
(.003)
(.004)
(.004)
(.001)
(.001)
(.001)
(.000)
(.000)
(.000)
(.003)
(.003)
(.003)
(.001)
(.001)
(.001)
(.000)
(.000)
(.000)
.038
.027
.022
.039
.027
.022
.040
.027
.022
.038
.027
.022
.038
.027
.022
.039
.027
.022
(.002)
(.001)
(.001)
(.001)
(.001)
(.001)
(.001)
(.000)
(.000)
(.002)
(.001)
(.001)
(.001)
(.001)
(.001)
(.001)
(.000)
(.000)
.488
.381
.362
1.000
.981
.617
1.000
1.000
1.000
.465
.396
.382
1.000
.953
.590
1.000
1.000
1.000
(.114)
(.117)
(.108)
(.000)
(.051)
(.064)
(.000)
(.000)
(.000)
(.108)
(.104)
(.074)
(.000)
(.075)
(.062)
(.000)
(.000)
(.000)
.394
.398
.399
.343
.372
.400
.256
.350
.353
.397
.401
.399
.346
.382
.400
.280
.350
.350
(.017)
(.009)
(.006)
(.017)
(.025)
(.003)
(.064)
(.002)
(.013)
(.022)
(.014)
(.005)
(.013)
(.024)
(.000)
(.029)
(.002)
(.000)
.964
.871
.809
1.000
1.000
.998
.956
1.000
1.000
.955
.841
.769
1.000
1.000
.995
1.000
1.000
1.000
(.046)
(.079)
(.083)
(.000)
(.000)
(.009)
(.205)
(.000)
(.000)
(.053)
(.068)
(.046)
(.000)
(.000)
(.015)
(.000)
(.000)
(.000)
Notes:
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are
the
m
ean
absolute
errorofthe
estim
ated
netw
ork
com
pared
to
the
true
netw
ork
forthe
socialinteraction
m
atrix
W
and
the
reduced
form
m
atrix
respectively.The
recovered
param
eterare
the
estim
ated
param
eters
averaged
across
iterations.A
llspecifications
include
tim
e
and
node
fixed
effects.S
tandard
errors
across
iterations
are
in
parentheses.
Table
A6:Sim
ulation
Results,OLS
A.Erdos-Renyi
B.Politicalparty
N
=
15
N
=
30
N
=
50
N
=
15
N
=
30
N
=
50
ࡹ
࡭
ࡰ
ࢃ ෢
ࡹ
࡭
ࡰ
ࢰ ෡
࣋ ෝࢼ ෡ࢽ ෝ
Table
A7:Sum
m
ary
Statistics,Tax
Com
petition
Application
Obs
M
ean
SD
M
in
q25
M
edian
q75
M
ax
State
totaltax
percapita
1296
.371
.266
.036
.145
.300
.530
1.345
State
incom
e
percapita
1296
9.951
2.130
4.105
8.585
9.919
11.375
18.808
U
nem
ploym
entrate
1296
5.885
2.242
1.800
4.200
5.500
7.000
18.000
Proportion
ofyoung
1296
.234
.033
.160
.210
.240
.260
.310
Proportion
ofelderly
1296
.106
.020
.040
.090
.110
.120
.190
State
governor's
age
1296
51.088
7.441
33.000
45.000
50.000
56.000
73.000
G
overnorterm
lim
itdum
m
y
1296
.258
.438
.000
.000
.000
1.000
1.000
State
totaltax
percapita
2688
0.983
0.803
0.036
0.037
0.813
1.557
4.298
State
incom
e
percapita
2736
13.268
4.016
4.147
10.348
12.960
15.879
27.974
U
nem
ploym
entrate
2688
5.764
2.026
1.800
4.300
5.400
6.800
17.800
Proportion
ofyoung
2688
0.236
0.033
0.170
0.210
0.230
0.260
0.340
Proportion
ofelderly
2688
0.117
0.023
0.050
0.100
0.120
0.130
0.190
State
governor's
age
2736
53.557
8.134
33.000
47.000
53.000
59.000
78.000
G
overnorterm
lim
itdum
m
y
2638
0.249
0.433
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
1.000
Notes:
S
um
m
ary
statistics
of
variables
(in
levels)
used
in
subsequent
regressions.
B
esley
and
C
ase
sam
ple
runs
from
1962
to
1988
and
extended
sam
ple
until2014.S
tate
totaltax
percapita
is
the
sum
ofsales,incom
e
and
corporation
tax
in
thousands
of1982
U
S
dollars.
S
tate
incom
e
percapita
in
thousands
of1982
U
S
dollars.P
roportion
ofyoung
is
the
proportion
ofthe
population
betw
een
5
and
17
years.P
roportion
ofelderly
is
the
proportion
ofthe
population
aged
65
orolder.S
tate
governor's
age
in
years.G
overnorterm
lim
itdum
m
y
is
equalto
1
ifgovernor
faces
term
lim
its
in
the
currentm
andate.D
ata
sources:S
tate
totaltax
percapita,C
ensus
ofG
overnm
ents
(1972,1977,1982,1987,1992-2016)
and
A
nnual
S
urvey
of
G
overm
ent
Finances
(all
other
years);
S
teta
incom
e
per
capita,
B
ureau
of
E
conom
ic
A
nalysis;
U
nem
ploym
ent
rate,
B
ureau
ofLaborS
tatistics;P
roportion
ofyoung
(aged
5-17)
and
elderly
(aged
65+),C
ensus
P
opulation
&
H
ousing
D
ata;S
tate
governor's
age
and
politicalvariables
m
anually
sourced
from
individualgovernor's
w
ebpages
on
W
ikipedia.
A.Besleyand
Case
sam
ple
(1962-1988)
B.Extended
sam
ple
(1962-2014)
Table
A8:Exogenous
SocialEffects
Dependentvariable:Change
in
percapitalincom
e
and
corporate
taxes
Coefficientestim
ates,standard
errors
in
parentheses
(1)Initial
(2)OLS
(3)2SLS:IVs
are
Characteristics
of
Neighbors
(4)2SLS:IVs
are
Characteristics
of
Neighbors-ofNeighbors
Econom
ic
Neighbors'tax
change
(t-[t-2])
.645
.145**
.332*
.608***
(.072)
(.199)
(.220)
Econom
ic
Neighbors'incom
e
percapita
.090
.098***
.091***
.080***
(.011)
(.012)
(.014)
Econom
ic
Neighbors'unem
ploym
entrate
37.200
9.899***
11.780***
13.714***
(3.443)
(2.856)
(3.022)
Econom
ic
Neighbors'population
aged
5-17
1378.1
376.2
478.5
596.6
(399.0)
(414.2)
(401.7)
Econom
ic
Neighbors'population
aged
65+
-4304.5
-842.8
-769.7*
-641.3
(504.3)
(450.2)
(468.6)
Econom
ic
Neighbors'governorage
-2.158
-0.311
-0.293
-0.263
(.281)
(.285)
(.294)
Period
FirstStage
(F-stat)
9.571
10.480
Controls
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
State
and
YearFixed
Effects
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Observations
2,952
2,952
2,544
2,592
1962-2015
Notes:
***
denotes
significance
at1%
,**
at5%
,and
*
at10%
.The
sam
ple
covers
48
m
ainland
U
S
states
running
from
1962
to
2015.The
dependent
variable
is
the
change
in
state
i's
total
taxes
per
capita
in
year
t.
In
allC
olum
ns,
w
e
penalize
geographic
neighbors
in
all
C
olum
ns
and
allow
for
exogenous
socialeffects.
In
O
LS
and
IV
regressions,
the
econom
ic
neighbors'effect
is
calculated
as
the
w
eighted
average
of
econom
ic
neighbors'
variables.O
LS
regressions
estim
ates
are
show
n
in
C
olum
n
2.C
olum
n
3
show
s
the
2S
LS
regression
w
here
each
geographic
neighbors'tax
change
is
instrum
ented
by
lagged
neighbor's
state
incom
e
per
capita
and
unem
ploym
ent
rate.
C
olum
n
4
show
s
a
2S
LS
regression
w
here
each
geographic
neighbors'tax
change
is
instrum
ented
by
lagged
neighbor-of-neighbor's
state
incom
e
percapita
and
unem
ploym
entrate.A
tthe
footofC
olum
ns
3
and
4
w
e
reportthe
p-value
on
the
F-statistic
from
the
firststage
ofthe
nullhypothesis
thatinstrum
ents
are
jointly
equalto
zero.A
llregressions
controlfor
state
i’s
incom
e
per
capita
in
1982
U
S
dollars,
state
i’s
unem
ploym
ent
rate,
the
proportion
of
young
(aged
5-17)
and
elderly
(aged
65+)
in
state
i’s
population,and
the
state
governor's
age.A
llspecifications
include
state
and
tim
e
fixed
effects.W
ith
the
exception
ofgovernor's
age,allvariables
are
differenced
betw
een
period
tand
period
t-2.R
obuststandard
errors
are
reported
in
parentheses.
Table
A9:GeneralEquilibrium
Im
pacts
ofCalifornia
Tax
Rise
Geographic
Neighbor
Network
Econom
ic
Neighbor
Network
Ratio
Average
tax
increase
0.0038
0.0066
1.74
Variance
tax
increase
0.0160
0.0153
0.96
Tax
dispersion
0.0053
0.0141
2.66
States
with
tax
increase
48
48
1.00
States
with
tax
increase
>
0.05%
11
44
4.00
States
with
tax
increase
>
0.5%
5
11
2.20
States
with
tax
increase
>
1%
4
8
2.00
States
with
tax
increase
>
2.5%
1
3
3.00
States
with
tax
increase
>
5%
1
1
1.00
Notes:This
show
s
the
equilibrium
im
pulse
responses
in
taxes
setin
each
state
as
a
resultofC
alifornia
increasing
its
tax
change
by
10%
.The
rho
coefficientis
derived
from
our
preferred
specification
to
estim
ate
the
econom
ic
netw
ork,w
here
w
e
penalize
geographic
neighbors
to
states,and
allow
for
exogenous
socialeffects
(based
on
a
sam
ple
of
48
m
ainland
U
S
states
running
from
1962
to
2015).
W
e
com
pare
these
derived
tax
changes
under
the
identified
econom
ic
netw
ork
structure,
relative
to
that
assum
ed
under
a
geographic
neighbors
structure.
The
finalC
olum
n
show
s
the
ratio
ofthe
sam
e
statistic
derived
undereach
netw
ork.
A. % of zeros B. % of non-zeros
C. Mean Absolute Deviation of D. Mean Absolute Deviation of
E. Endogenous Social Effect, F. Exogenous Social Effect
Notes: These simulation results are based on the Adaptive Elastic Net GMM algorithm, with penalization parameters chosen
by BIC, under various true networks and time periods T=5, 10, 15, 25, 50, 100, 125 and 150. In all cases, 1000 Monte Carlo
iterations were performed. The true parameters are rho-0=.3, beta-0=.4 and gamma-0=.5. In Panel A, the % of zeroes refers
to the proportion of true zero elements in the social interaction matrix that are estimated as smaller than .05. In Panel B, the %
of non-zeros refers to the proportion of true elements greater than .3 in the social interaction matrix that are estimated as non-
zeros. In Panels C and D, the Mean Absolute Deviations are the mean absolute error of the estimated network compared to
the true network for the social interaction matrix W and the reduced form matrix respectively. In Panels E and F, the true
parameter values are marked in the horizontal red lines. The recovered parameter are the estimated parameters averaged
across iterations. All specifications include time and node fixed effects.
Figure A1: Simulation Results, Adaptive Elastic Net GMM
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Figure A2: Simulated and True Networks
Notes: These simulation results are based on the Elastic Net algorithm, with penalization parameters chosen by BIC, under various
true networks and time periods T=50, 100 and 150. In the two stylized networks (Erdos-Renyi and political party), we set N=30, and
the real world networks, the high school friendship and village network are based on N=65 and 70 non-isolated nodes respectively.
Party leaders in the political party network are marked in black in Panel B. In all cases, 1,000 Monte Carlo iterations were performed.
The true parameters are rho-0=.3, beta-0=.4 and gamma-0=.5. All specifications include time and node fixed effects. Kept edges are
depicted in blue: these links are estimated as non-zero in at least 5% of the iterations and are also non-zero in the true network.
Added edges are depicted in green: these links are estimated as non-zero in at least 5% of the iterations but the edge is zero in the
true network. Removed edges are depicted in red: these links are estimated as zero in at least 5% of the iterations but are non-zero in
the true network. The figures further distinguish between strong and weak links: strong links are shown in solid edges (whose strength
is greater than or equal to .3), and weak links are shown as dashed edges.
A. Erdos-Renyi B. Political Party
C. High-school D. Village
A. % of zeros B. % of non-zeros
C. Mean Absolute Deviation of D. Mean Absolute Deviation of
E. Endogenous Social Effect, F. Exogenous Social Effect
Figure A3: Simulation Results, Adaptive Elastic Net GMM
Erdos-Renyi graph (N=30)
Notes: Simulations with common shocks between the exogenous variable and the error term: time-constant and varying at the
individual level ("individual"), constant across individuals and varying over time ("time") and both types of shocks. These
simulation results are based on the Adaptive Elastic Net GMM algorithm, with penalization parameters chosen by BIC, under
various true networks and time periods T=25, 50, 100, 125 and 150. In all cases, 1000 Monte Carlo iterations were performed.
The true parameters are rho-0=.3, beta-0=.4 and gamma-0=.5. In Panel A, the % of zeroes refers to the proportion of true zero
elements in the social interaction matrix that are estimated as smaller than .05. In Panel B, the % of non-zeros refers to the
proportion of true elements greater than .3 in the social interaction matrix that are estimated as non-zeros. In Panels C and D,
the Mean Absolute Deviations are the mean absolute error of the estimated network compared to the true network for the social
interaction matrix W and the reduced form matrix respectively. In Panels E and F, the true parameter values are marked in the
horizontal red lines. The recovered parameter are the estimated parameters averaged across iterations. All specifications
include time and node fixed effects.
Alternative Structures of Shocks
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Positive
values
indicate
higherequilibrium
taxes
underEconom
ic
neighbors
than
geographic
neighbors
Negative
values
indicate
low
equilibrium
taxes
underEconom
ic
neighbors
than
geographic
neighbors
Figure
A4:GeneralEquilibrium
Im
pacts
ofCA
Tax
Rise
Shocks
State's
Reaction
to
10%
increase
in
CA
taxes
Log(equilibrium
taxes
underW
-econ)-Log(equilibrium
taxes
underW
-geo)
Notes:
This
show
s
the
equilibrium
im
pulse
responses
in
taxes
set
in
each
state
as
a
result
of
C
alifornia
increasing
its
tax
change
by
10%
.
This
is
as
derived
from
our
preferred
specification,w
here
w
e
penalize
geographic
neighbors
to
states,and
allow
forexogenous
socialeffects.W
e
com
pare
these
derived
tax
changes
underthe
identified
econom
ic
netw
ork
structure,relative
to
thatassum
ed
undera
geographic
neighbors
structure.W
e
graph
the
log
change
in
equilibrium
taxes
undereconom
ic
neighbors,m
inus
the
log
change
in
equilibrium
taxes
under
geographic
neighbors.
P
ositive
values
(red
shaded)
states
indicate
higher
equilibrium
taxes
under
econom
ic
neighbors
than
geographic
neighbors,
and
negative
values
(blue
shaded)states
indicate
low
erequilibrium
taxes
undereconom
ic
neighbors
than
geographic
neighbors.
